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Schooling at Risk 
Barbara Fedders* 
ABSTRACT: For much of the nation’s history, states excluded entire groups 
of students from mainstream public-school classrooms based on classifications 
of race or disability. Although Brown vs. Board of Education and its 
progeny, as well as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, now 
prohibit the most blatant and egregious forms of this type of exclusion, a new 
version has emerged. Over the last thirty years, schools have suspended, and 
transferred into separate schools known as Alternative Education Programs 
(“AEPs”), a significant and growing number of students. 
Proponents of this new version of exclusion argue that these practices can help 
to curb misbehavior, promote school safety, and assist students in obtaining 
academic success. Yet research shows that suspending students does little to 
improve behavior; nor does it necessarily improve school safety. And while 
policymakers intend for AEPs to re-engage students at risk of educational 
failure, they are often demonstrably inferior to regular public schools and thus 
unable to accomplish these stated objectives. Perhaps most troubling, the 
individual students at greatest risk of suspension and transfer to AEPs are 
from those groups once subject to de jure segregation and outright bans from 
classrooms: African-American students and students with disabilities.  
This Article contextualizes suspension and AEP transfer within the longer 
history of exclusion of Black students and students with disabilities. It 
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describes how pre-civil rights school districts justified group-based exclusion of 
African-American students and students with disabilities on the basis that 
they were undeserving of the full promise of public education. It then analyzes 
the rise in suspensions and growth of AEPs and outlines their problematic 
features, while drawing important parallels between the new exclusion and 
the historical trope of the underserving child. It shows the ways in which 
suspension resists legal challenge, as well as how traditional tools for 
promoting educational equity are likely to be inadequate in addressing the 
flaws of AEPs. Looking forward toward possible solutions, the Article 
commends the small but growing number of schools finding non-exclusionary 
ways to address misbehavior and suggests that rather than seek to reform 
AEPs, policymakers should consider abandoning this failed educational 
innovation. 
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“How does it feel to be a problem?” 1 
 
“I would show up, I would sit down and listen to music the whole time. I didn’t really 
make any progress the whole time I was there . . . .” 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 A new version of school exclusion has emerged over the last thirty years. 
During this period, schools have increasingly employed out-of-school 
suspensions and involuntary transfers. Since the 1970s, many students’ 
chances of suspension have doubled.3 In the 2011–2012 school year, the most 
recent for which data are available, 3.5 million students—nearly 7% of the 
total number of enrolled students—received at least one out-of-school 
suspension, while over 100,000 students were expelled.4 In addition, school 
districts have begun to transfer a growing number of students struggling with 
academic or behavioral issues out of regular public schools and into 
Alternative Education Programs (“AEPs”).5 Over half a million students 
attend AEPs each year.6  
States and school districts make reference to purported educational 
benefits in justifying suspension and AEP transfer. Suspension typically rests 
on notions that removal from school can deter future misbehavior by the 
offending student.7 AEPs are meant to provide a different, ostensibly more 
 
 1. WILLIAM EDWARD BURGHARDT DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND 
SKETCHES 2 (1904). 
 2. Heather Vogell & Hannah Fresques, ‘Alternative’ Education: Using Charter Schools to Hide 
Dropouts and Game the System, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/ 
alternative-education-using-charter-schools-hide-dropouts-and-game-system (quoting Thiago Mello, 
who spent a year at an alternative education program and left without graduating). 
 3. Derek Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) (citing DANIEL 
LOSEN ET AL., CTR. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES, ARE WE CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP? 6 
(2015), https://perma.cc/R2PH-2F24). 
 4. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, DATA 
SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 2 (2014), https://perma.cc/MH78-N72B. 
 5. Camilla A. Lehr et al., Alternative Schools: A Synthesis of State-Level Policy and Research, 30 
REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 19, 23–24 (2009). 
 6. Id. at 23 (noting that there were 646,500 students enrolled in public school districts 
attending alternative schools and programs for at-risk students in 2007–2008); Hannah Fresques 
et al., Methodology: How We Analyzed Alternative Schools Data, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 21, 2017), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/alternative-schools-methodology (noting alternative school 
students number roughly half a million). 
 7. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (“Suspension is . . . a valuable educational 
device.”); see also infra notes 232–39 and accompanying text. 
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supportive environment for students at risk.8 The “at risk” category is 
capacious, typically encompassing academic problems as well as misbehavior 
both in and out of school.9 
Yet research reveals that suspension and AEP transfer in fact have little 
proven educational benefit, and they instead cause significant harm.10 
Suspended students fall behind in their studies11 and face a heightened risk 
of involvement in the juvenile and criminal systems.12 In addition, high rates 
of suspension in a school can negatively affect both the climate in the 
classrooms they leave behind and the safety and academic achievement of the 
remaining students.13 AEPs are designed to be inferior to regular public schools 
in significant respects, including curricular offerings and extracurricular 
opportunities.14 In-person instruction is frequently absent; when teachers are 
present, they are often less qualified than their counterparts in regular public 
schools.15 AEPs frequently mete out comparably harsher forms of discipline 
than regular schools.16 Students assigned to AEPs thus tend to become more 
rather than less alienated from school, with significant numbers leaving 
school entirely.17  
 
 8. See PRISCILLA ROUSE CARVER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS AND 
PROGRAMS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS AT RISK OF EDUCATIONAL FAILURE: 2007–08, at 1 
(2010), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010026.pdf (discussing purpose of alternative schools 
and programs. 
 9. See, e.g., ALLAN POROWSKI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., HOW DO STATES DEFINE ALTERNATIVE 
EDUCATION? 1 (2014), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED546775.pdf (noting “little consensus” 
among states on how to define alternative education); N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES FOR ALTERNATIVE LEARNING PROGRAMS AND SCHOOLS GRADES K-12, at 8 (2014), 
http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/docs/alp/develop/alpmanual.pdf [hereinafter N.C. POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES] (providing examples of circumstances that make a student eligible for placement in an 
alternative learning program, including, inter alia, “alienation from school,” “tardiness and/or poor 
school attendance,” “abuse and neglect,” and “other risk factors”). 
 10. TONY FABELO ET AL., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 54 (2011), https:// 
csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Breaking_Schools_Rules_Report_Final.pdf; see 
also Vogell & Fresques, supra note 2 (noting high percentages of Florida alternative school students 
who leave school and criticizing the school district practice of eliminating those numbers when 
calculating dropout rates). For harms of suspension see infra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
 11. CHERYL ANDERSON ET AL., RESTORATIVE PRACTICES: FOSTERING HEALTHY RELATIONSHIPS  
& PROMOTING POSITIVE DISCIPLINE IN SCHOOLS 4 (2014), http://schottfoundation.org/sites/default/ 
files/restorative-practices-guide.pdf (“Students who are not in class are, of course, not doing much 
learning. Thus, students subjected to harsh disciplinary measures that exclude them from school tend 
to fall behind academically.”).  
 12. See FABELO ET AL., supra note 10, at 61. 
 13. Black, supra note 3, at 45–47. 
 14. See infra notes 194–205 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 213, 216 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra note 335 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 10; see also 
ACLU, MISSING THE MARK: ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS IN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 51 (2009), 
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This new version of school exclusion raises critical issues of inclusion and 
equity. Students who are suspended are disproportionately African-American 
students and students with disabilities.18 So too are AEP transferees..19 Today’s 
AEPs in important respects resemble the pre-civil rights era’s separate and 
inferior educational settings for students of color and disabled students.20 Yet 
the new school exclusion remains underexamined by legal scholars.21 
This Article situates suspension and AEP transfer within the longer 
history of exclusion of African-American students and students with 
disabilities. For much of the nation’s history, states and school districts 
banned or consigned to inferior school settings youths based on classifications 
of race or disability.22 Courts upheld exclusion on the grounds that some 
groups of students were undeserving of inclusion in regular classrooms. In 
affirming the ability of a school district to maintain a segregated system before 
the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, for example, one court stated that 
education “is a beneficent State institution . . . and surely those who create 
the charity have the undoubted right to nominate the beneficiaries of it.”23 
Before the passage of federal legislation creating education rights for students 
with disabilities,24 state courts regularly upheld the practice of barring such 
students. One court affirmed a school district’s decision to bar a child from 
the public schools because “his physical condition and ailment produces a 
depressing and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school children.”25  
While legal precedent and statutes have remediated the most blatant and 
egregious of these practices,26 I argue here that the notion that some children 
are undeserving of the full promise of public education persists. Today, 
 
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/racialjustice/missingthemark_report.pdf (noting that alternative 
programs can increase dropout rates). 
 18. See infra notes 161–66 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 224–25 and accompanying text. 
 20. See discussion infra Section III.C–D. 
 21. A Westlaw search for articles specifically addressing charter schools and tuition vouchers 
revealed 141 articles published since January 1, 2006. By contrast, a Westlaw search for articles 
specifically addressing alternative education programs conducted without any date parameters 
found only 17 articles, many of which are student notes. 
 22. See infra notes 55–82 and accompanying text.  
 23. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 40 (1874). 
 24. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 25. State ex. rel. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ. of Antigo, 172 N.W. 153, 154 (Wis. 1919). 
 26. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding de jure school segregation 
unconstitutional); see also Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (guaranteeing all 
handicapped children a right to a public education “designed to meet their unique needs”); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012) (modifying and expanding the principles of free, appropriate public 
education for students with disabilities by way of a requirement that students with disabilities be 
maintained in a classroom with non-disabled children “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate”); Erika 
K. Wilson, The New School Segregation, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 158–63 (2016) (summarizing post-
Brown jurisprudence that attempted to dismantle segregation). 
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developmentally normative student misbehavior can result in removal from 
school.27 In addition, districts transfer students out of their schools and into 
AEPs after labeling them disruptive, or “low perform[ing].”28 The rhetoric 
surrounding suspensions and AEP transfers echoes the discourse that 
accompanied earlier group-based exclusion. In this way, an historical trope of 
the undeserving child justifies and even normalizes the ongoing exclusion of 
African-American students and students with disabilities. 
Traditional tools for promoting educational equity are largely 
inadequate to confront the new exclusion. Suspended students have minimal 
recourse to challenge their suspensions; those who exercise their rights to 
appeal encounter procedural obstacles and experience limited success.29 The 
unique features of AEPs—small size, off-campus physical location, and 
transitory student population—place them largely outside the federal and 
state regulatory ambit for schools. As a result, students at risk of this new form 
of exclusion must rely on school districts voluntarily adopting alternatives to 
suspension and AEP transfer as means of addressing student misbehavior.30  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II offers the historical context within 
which the current form of exclusion is situated. It describes the central norm 
of universal public education advanced by the 19th century “common school” 
movement. It details the history of outright bans, and later segregation, of 
African-American students and students with disabilities. It demonstrates that 
the notion that these groups were undeserving of education animated those 
exclusionary practices. Part III demonstrates that while de jure segregation has 
ended and federal laws now protect students with disabilities, the trope of an 
undeserving child persists. It supports this contention through detailing the 
increase in misbehavior-based exclusion and rise of AEPs. It analyzes how the 
structure and operation of AEPs work to harm rather than help students and 
thus reinforce notions that the students within them are undeserving. Part IV 
examines the difficulty of combatting suspension with legal remedies and 
shows that key legal and legislative strategies that advocates have used to curb 
 
 27. See J. Kevin Jenkins & John Dayton, Commentary, Students, Weapons, and Due Process: An 
Analysis of Zero Tolerance Policies in Public Schools, 171 WEST’S ED. L. REP. 13, 14–16 (2003) 
(recounting examples of suspensions under “zero tolerance” policies). 
 28. Vogell & Fresques, supra note 2 (quoting Randle Richardson, who ran schools for 
students who had committed disciplinary violations). 
 29. See infra Part IV.A. 
 30. For an example of laudable reforms, see, e.g., NORTHSIDE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL OF THE 
NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL-CARRBORO CITY SCHOOLS DISTRICT OF N.C., POSITIVE 
BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTION AND SUPPORT, http://nes.chccs.k12.nc.us/parents/pbis-positive-
behavior-intervention-and-support; CHCCS Leaders Take Aim at Racial Disparities in School Discipline, 
CHAPELBORO.COM (Sept. 8, 2015), http://chapelboro.com/featured/chccs-leaders-take-aim-at-
racial-disparities-in-school-discipline (describing changes in this district meant to reduce out-of-
school discipline). But see Black, supra note 3, at 57–71 (arguing that students can utilize 
precedent from school-finance cases to challenge suspension and that reliance on voluntary 
changes is bound to be unsuccessful at achieving widespread reform). 
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the most blatant forms of exclusion are ill-equipped to reform the flaws of the 
AEP. Looking forward toward possible solutions, Part IV notes as a welcome 
trend the small but growing number of schools that have implemented 
alternatives to exclusionary forms of discipline. It concludes by arguing that 
while individual districts may be able to institute small improvements in AEPs, 
this particular educational innovation should be abandoned.   
II. SCHOOLING FOR SECOND-CLASS CITIZENSHIP 
While suspension and AEP transfer are aimed at individual students 
based on misbehavior or personal or family circumstances, group-based 
exclusionary practices have a long historical lineage. Subpart A sets forth the 
inclusionary aspirations of the “common school” movement of the 19th 
century. Subpart B juxtaposes those aspirations against the reality of exclusion 
based on race, ethnicity, and disability that has persisted throughout the 
history of public education. This section also demonstrates how poverty has 
exacerbated the impact of race- and disability-based exclusion.  
A. THE MOVEMENT FOR COMMON SCHOOLS 
Although the church and the family were the primary instruments of 
education in the colonies, the desirability of state-sponsored public schooling 
occupied a prominent place in political thought at the time of the nation’s 
founding.31 George Washington, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson in 
particular believed public education was essential to a democracy.32  
Notwithstanding the Founders’ articulation of the importance of 
education to the health of the Republic, the structure of the U.S. Constitution 
relegated the federal government to a secondary role in education.33 Because 
education is omitted from the purview of federal authority, state and local 
 
 31. IRA KATZNELSON & MARGARET WEIR, SCHOOLING FOR ALL: CLASS, RACE, AND THE 
DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 32–33 (1985) (noting that while some localities in 17th 
century Massachusetts provided formal schooling, outside of New England public schooling did 
not constitute a fact of public life). 
 32. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS 
THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 13 (2004). The Founders’ commitment to education was 
apparent in two Land Ordinances enacted by the Continental Congress, which reserved specified 
land parcels for the maintenance of public schools within each township and promoted 
education as a key principle of governance in newly admitted states. See Barry Friedman & Sara 
Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 114 n.129 (2013) 
(citing Northwest Ordinance of 1787 art. III, reprinted in U.S.C.A. Northwest Ordinance, which 
declares “[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the 
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged”). 
 33. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 
1038 (1995) (“[Public schools] were unknown, as they now exist, at the time of the adoption of 
the Federal Constitution; that instrument is silent upon the subject of education, and our public 
schools are wholly the creation of our own State Constitution and State laws.” (quoting Ward v. 
Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 40 (1874))).  
A1_FEDDERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2018 1:01 PM 
878 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:871 
governments are charged with creating and regulating the institutions of 
primary and secondary public education.34 
At the state level, a campaign to establish schooling for all citizens began 
in earnest in 1830.35 Horace Mann, Secretary of the Massachusetts 
Commission to Improve Education, advanced the notion that young people 
should be educated in “common” schools that would supplement what 
families taught their children at home,36 envisioning them as “common, not 
as inferior . . . but as the light and air are common.”37 Proponents of this idea 
envisioned free, public schools where children of all socioeconomic 
backgrounds would share the same classroom, learning skills and habits that 
would make them productive and law-abiding.38 Echoing themes articulated 
by Jefferson, common-school proponents argued that an educated citizenry is 
necessary for democracy;39 that education promotes economic self-sufficiency 
and social mobility;40 and that common schooling creates social cohesion.41 
 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See generally Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education 
Federalism, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 959, 968–69 (2015) (discussing constitutional foundations of 
state and local control of education). 
 35. JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH, 1860–1935, at 2 (1988); 
see Friedman & Solow, supra note 32, at 122–27 (discussing combination of nativist, progressive, 
and egalitarian motivations for movement for universal schooling). 
 36. Horace Mann, Twelfth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Board of Education, in THE 
REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE MANN ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 79–112 (Lawrence 
A. Cremin ed.,1957). 
 37. THE INST. FOR EDUC. EQUITY & OPPORTUNITY, EDUCATION IN THE 50 STATES: A 
DESKBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS ABOUT EDUCATION 32 (2008) 
(omission in original) (quoting Molly O’Brien & Amanda Woodrum, The Constitutional Common 
School, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 581, 611 (2004)). 
 38. KATZNELSON & WEIR, supra note 31, at 50 (describing common-school sentiment 
through quoting the first superintendent of the Chicago public schools, who argued in 1854: 
“Tear down our School Houses and turn our children into the streets, and our political 
institutions would be involved in the ruin.”). 
 39. Political philosophers have echoed this theme. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND 
EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 101 (1916) (“The devotion 
of democracy to education is a familiar fact.”); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 134 
(1987) (“The democratic truth in equalization is that all children should learn enough to be able 
not just to live a minimally decent life, but also to participate effectively in the democratic 
processes by which individual choices are socially structured. A democratic state, therefore, must 
take steps to avoid those inequalities that deprive children of educational attainment adequate 
to participate in the political processes.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 40. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (accepting as valid State of Wisconsin’s 
argument that state interest in preparing individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants 
in society justified compulsory education law); John Dewey, A Democratic Conception of Education, in 
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 47, 48 (Randall Curran, ed. 2007) (arguing that a socially mobile 
society must ensure that “its members are educated to personal initiative and adaptability”).  
 41. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216–17, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); see KATZNELSON & WEIR, supra note 31, at 45 (framing this argument in terms more 
instrumental and perhaps cynical, noting that economic and political elites feared that 
industrialization and immigration in urban areas created problems of potential unrest and thus 
pursued educational reform as an instrument of order).  
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Common-school reform replaced the practice of providing free education 
only to the very poor; “public school” thus shed much of its previous stigma.42 
By the end of the 19th century, most states made primary schooling 
universally available—“at least for white children.”43 By 1918, every state had 
adopted compulsory attendance laws.44 The Supreme Court has recognized 
the centrality of education to American life, finding public schools to be, 
variously, “a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic 
system of government,”45 “the most important function of state and local 
governments,”46 and to play “a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of 
our society.”47 Education spending currently represents the largest budget 
item in most state budgets.48  
B. THE REALITY OF EXCLUSION 
The social-cohesion goal of the common-school movement has rested 
uncomfortably next to the reality of systematic exclusion of entire groups of 
students from the project of universally available public education.49 The most 
prominent historical examples are the widespread practice of banning, and 
later segregating, groups of students based on classifications of race and 
 
 42. Id. (describing how education was formerly reserved for “paupers”). 
 43. KATZNELSON & WEIR, supra note 31, at 58. Southern states were generally slower to adopt 
the idea of state-sponsored education than elsewhere in the country. See McConnell, supra note 
33, at 1039 (noting that public schools that did exist in the pre-War South “served only a fraction 
of the school-age population”). See generally ANDERSON, supra note 35 (noting that pre-War 
southern politicians resisted state-administered, mandatory public education for white and Black 
youth, viewing it as an improper intervention in the natural social hierarchy). 
 44. William Galston, Parents, Government, and Children: Authority over Education in a Pluralist 
Liberal Democracy, 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 284, 291 (2011).  
 45. Sch. Dist. Of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
 46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 47. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). While the Supreme Court stopped short of 
holding that compulsory school attendance required parents to send their children to public 
schools, it granted states a broad right to regulate public school alternatives. See, e.g., Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002) (upholding a voucher program providing tuition aid for 
students attending private schools); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 
268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (“No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to 
regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require 
that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character 
and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, 
and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.”); Combs v. Homer-
Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 254 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding Pennsylvania law governing reporting 
and review requirements of home school children). Cf. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 
(1927) (striking down extensive regulation of Japanese schools because the regulation, as a whole, 
was “a deliberate plan to bring foreign language schools under a strict governmental control for 
which the record discloses no adequate reason”). 
 48. KAHLENBERG, supra note 32, at 3.  
 49. See infra notes 51–82 and accompanying text. 
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disability.50 Implicit in the resistance of states to making education widely 
available is a notion that public education properly may be provided to or 
withheld from particular groups based on popular notions regarding the 
worthiness of those groups.51 This vision of education as a “grand State 
charity”52 to be distributed only to groups deemed deserving found early 
expression in the criminalization of literacy for enslaved people,53 as well as 
practices barring students with disabilities from school.54  
1. Race and Ethnicity 
The Jeffersonian vision of public education was of schooling only for free 
citizens.55 From 1800 to around 1830, many southern states passed legislation 
criminalizing teaching literacy to enslaved children.56 Indeed, the education 
policies and practices of the antebellum South reflected a belief that peace 
and prosperity depended on repression of literacy among its enslaved 
population. 57  
Immediately after Emancipation, Black58 southerners, supported by the 
Freedmen’s Bureau and Congressional Radical Republicans, laid a 
 
 50. LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S 
COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 8 (2010) (documenting historical 
examples of denial of access to education). 
 51. Id. (“[I]t is our continuing comfort with profound inequality that is the Achilles heel of 
American education.”). 
 52. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 40 (1874). 
 53. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The “Law Only As An Enemy”: The 
Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 
N.C. L. REV. 969, 1020 (1992) (describing the extent to which criminal law prevented the literacy 
and education of Black persons in Virginia); see also Daniel Kiel, No Caste Here? Toward a Structural 
Critique of American Education, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 611, 615 & n.15 (2015) (citing the 1740 
South Carolina “Act for the Better Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Other Slaves in this 
Province,” which stated that teaching slaves to read or write “may be attended with great 
inconveniences” and imposed a one hundred pound fine). 
 54. See, e.g., Watson v. Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864 (Mass. 1893) (upholding state’s exclusion 
from the public schools of a student deemed “weak of mind”); State ex rel. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ. 
of Antigo, 172 N.W. 153 (Wis. 1919) (subordinating the individual rights of a student with 
disabilities to the school board’s determination of what is in the general welfare of the school). 
 55. DAVID TYACK ET. AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785–1954, at 134 
(1987); see also ANDERSON, supra note 35, at 1 (noting Jefferson’s argument in 1787 to the 
Virginia legislature in support of three years of public schooling for residents of the 
commonwealth and enrollment of the brightest students in publicly funded grammar school and 
college was reserved for free citizens). 
 56. ANDERSON, supra note 35, at 2. 
 57. See id. 
 58. This Article adopts a scholarly convention of using the upper-case “B” when discussing 
Black people because “Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific 
cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.” Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As 
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1710 n.3 (1993) (quoting Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, 
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1331, 1332 n.2 (1988)). 
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foundation for public education that would be available to white and newly 
emancipated Black citizens.59 The Reconstruction Act of 1867 established 
that no state that had seceded would be readmitted to the Union until 
Congress had examined its state constitution and found it to be “in conformity 
with the Constitution of the United States in all respects.”60 As a result, 
Southern states amended their constitutions to make clear that Black citizens 
could not be barred outright from public education.61  
However, throughout the next near century, states across the country 
segregated schools by race and ethnicity. At the time, commentators defended 
segregation as advancing the best interests of both the excluded and 
dominant group.62 In support of a separate-school law for children of Black, 
Chinese, and Indian descent, a California newspaper editorial opined:  
[The codes] let us keep our public schools free from the intrusion 
of the inferior races. If we are compelled to have Negroes and 
Chinamen among us, it is better, of course, that they should be 
educated. But teach them separately from our own children. Let us 
preserve our Caucasian blood pure. We want no mongrel race of 
moral and mental hybrids to people the mountains and valleys of 
California.63 
Racially segregated schools were often characterized by massive race-based 
disparities; adequate and equitable funding never took hold.64 Just three years 
after his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,65 Justice Harlan voted to uphold 
 
 59. TYACK ET AL., supra note 55, at 136. 
 60. McConnell, supra note 33, at 962 & n.51 (citing Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 
428) (“Tennessee was readmitted before passage of the Act, and is therefore the only Confederate state 
to be readmitted under its antebellum state constitution . . . .”). 
 61. Id. at 963 (discussing the fact that the question of whether education should be racially 
integrated was not explicitly decided in all Southern states but noting that “no constitutional 
convention of a Southern state seeking readmission to the Union openly adopted a policy of 
racially segregated education”).  
 62. See, e.g., Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 209 (1849) (upholding an order requiring a 
Black child to attend a “colored” school instead of a white school, even though the white school was 
closer to her home, because the city schools committee had considered “the best interests of both 
classes of children placed under their superintendence” when it decided to segregate the schools). 
 63. Joyce Kuo, Note, Excluded, Segregated and Forgotten: A Historical View of the Discrimination of 
Chinese Americans in Public Schools, 5 ASIAN L.J. 181, 190 (1998) (alteration in original).  
 64. TYACK ET AL., supra note 55, at 135 (noting that in the Black schools in the South, “no 
more than 30% of school-age children were enrolled, [and] salaries of teachers declined”; white 
schools, by contrast, gained more resources); see also Kiel, supra note 53, at 615 (“In Alabama, . . . 
as Reconstruction waned, spending on teacher salaries in white and Black schools, which had 
once been roughly equal, diverged to the point that teacher spending was $30 per white student 
and less than $1 per African American student.”). 
 65. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n view of the 
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of 
citizens. There is no caste here.”).  
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the system of separate and unequal schools.66 De jure segregation remained 
the law of the land for the next five decades.67 One historian describes the 
development of separate public-school systems as constituting “two 
contradictory traditions of American education”: “schooling for democratic 
citizenship and schooling for second–class citizenship.”68 
2. Disability 
Until the passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 
1975,69 states regularly barred students from mainstream classrooms on the 
ground that their differences in physical, emotional or intellectual ability70 
rendered them unworthy of inclusion.71 Public schools instead consigned 
these students to classrooms with “severely substandard academic programs 
. . . separated from the general student population . . . [and] often located in 
basements or boiler rooms.”72 Additionally, students with disabilities were 
 
 66. Cumming v. Richmond Cty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 544 (1899) (upholding a local 
school board’s decision to close a Black public high school for financial reasons, despite the fact 
that the white public high school remained open). Pre-Brown courts upheld segregated schooling 
of other racial and ethnic minorities. See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 81–82 (1927) 
(holding that a Chinese student was “not entitled” to attend a white school, even though it was 
the only school in her school district, but instead was required to attend a colored school in her 
county). I focus in this Article primarily on examples of segregation of Black students as this 
population is disproportionately represented in AEPs.  
 67. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491 (1954) (noting that American courts 
labored with the “separate but equal” doctrine for over half a century).  
 68. See ANDERSON, supra note 35, at 1. 
 69. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773.  
 70. While “disability” has many possible meanings, in this Article I follow the definition from the 
federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(a) (2012) (defining “child 
with a disability” as including “a child—(i) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments (including 
deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious 
emotional disturbance (referred to in this chapter as ‘emotional disturbance’), orthopedic 
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning 
disabilities”); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(a)–(b) (2012) (A “specific learning disability [is] a disorder 
in 1 or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, 
spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in the imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, 
read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations. . . . Disorders . . . include[] such conditions as 
perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia.”). 
At the time of the enactment of The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, advocates wanted 
to include in the category a broader range of problems, including those that result from poverty or 
other environmental circumstances that impair a child’s learning. However, the statute as enacted 
explicitly excludes such conditions. For a critique of the definition of disability that excludes 
environmental conditions, see generally RUTH COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (2013) (describing the need for a definition of 
disabilities that includes environmental circumstances or poverty). For an examination of the changes 
in the definition of disability and how they affect legal claims, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, 
Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 402–16 (2000).  
 71. Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in Special Education, 117 
YALE L.J. 1802, 1811 (2008).  
 72. Id. 
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often enrolled in institutions that played “multiple roles as school, hospital, 
[and] penal institution.”73 Disability advocates and scholars estimate that 
prior to 1975, when the law was passed, three million school-aged children 
with disabilities were not receiving adequate educational services.74  
Well into the 20th century, courts did not interfere with schools’ 
exclusionary practices for children with disabilities. The exclusion was 
typically justified as necessary for the orderly maintenance of classrooms and 
acceptable because students with disabilities could not benefit from, and thus 
did not merit, education. In 1893, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed the exclusion of a child who was deemed “so weak in mind as not to 
derive any marked benefit from instruction.”75 In Beattie v. Board of Education, 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the exclusion of a student who was 
“slow and hesitating in speech . . . [and] ha[d] a nervous and excitable 
nature,” because his presence was claimed by the school to be bothersome to 
both teachers and students.76 
Some state legislatures required that schools exclude students with 
disabilities. At least one state made it a crime for parents to seek to enroll their 
excluded disabled children in public school.77 Policies that permitted and 
facilitated exclusion based on disability can be seen in cases from the previous 
two centuries that otherwise appear to promote inclusion. In a 1947 case 
upholding Mexican students’ rights to attend public schools, the Ninth 
Circuit noted, “[a]ll petitioners are taxpayers of good moral habits, not 
suffering from disability . . . and are qualified to be admitted to the use of the 
schools and facilities within their respective districts and systems.”78 In a case 
from the 19th century, Tape v. Hurley, a San Francisco school district barred 
an Asian student from enrolling.79 The plaintiff challenged the ban, arguing 
that her residence in the district meant she should have been permitted to 
attend.80 The California Supreme Court agreed.81 The code at the time stated: 
“Every school, unless otherwise provided by law, must be open for the 
admission of all children between six and twenty-one years of age residing in 
the district . . . . Trustees shall have the power to exclude children of filthy or 
vicious habits . . . .”82 The code did not define the italicized phrase; its failure 
 
 73. ROBERT L. OSGOOD, THE HISTORY OF INCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (2005).  
 74. Stanley S. Herr, Special Education Law and Children with Reading and Other Disabilities, 28 
J.L. & EDUC. 337, 344 (1999). 
 75. Watson v. City of Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 864 (Mass. 1893).  
 76. State ex rel. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ. of Antigo, 172 N.W. 153, 154 (Wis. 1919).  
 77. See generally MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE (1992) 
(describing statutory ban in North Carolina).  
 78. Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange Cty. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 776 (9th Cir. 1947) 
(emphasis added). 
 79. Tape v. Hurley, 66 Cal. 473, 473 (1885). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 473–74. 
 82. Id. (emphasis added). 
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to do so presumably opened the door for school districts to exercise their 
discretion to exclude children whose physical condition or otherwise 
bothersome demeanor rendered them displeasing to administrators.  
3. The Compounding Effect of Poverty 
A student’s poverty has never subjected her to exclusion in the way that 
race, ethnicity, and disability have. States have never barred poor students 
from receiving a public education. Nor have they explicitly consigned them 
to substandard settings.83 Even prior to the common-school movement, free 
education was provided to indigent people.84 The vision of common-school 
proponents was that free and widespread public education would in fact 
promote economic mobility.85  
Nonetheless, poverty functions to prevent poor students from realizing 
the full benefits of public education.86 Poverty makes it more likely that a child 
will experience multiple challenges that hamper her readiness for school and 
performance as a student. “These include homelessness . . . ; exposure to 
environmental pollutants; lack of access to healthcare . . . ; and . . . chronic 
stress and depression. Some studies suggest poverty-induced stress can stunt 
brain growth.”87 
As a result of these challenges, students from economically disadvantaged 
backgrounds struggle to attain academic success.88 The effects of poverty are 
compounded in “high-poverty” schools, defined as those in which more than 
75% of students qualify for a free or reduced-price lunch.89 High-poverty 
 
 83. KATZNELSON & WEIR, supra note 31, at 15–16 (noting that U.S. schools have no class-
based barriers to access). 
 84. THE INST. FOR EDUC. EQUITY & OPPORTUNITY, supra note 37, at 32–33 (noting that 
stigma attached to attending free school, as it was conceptualized as charity for paupers).  
 85. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, For Schools, Long Road to a Level Playing Field, N.Y. TIMES (May 
20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/business/economy/for-schools-long-road-
to-a-level-playing-field.html (noting egalitarian aspirations of public education in the United 
States); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Henry M. Levin, On the Relationship Between Poverty and Curriculum, 85 N.C. L. REV. 
1381, 1389–95 (2007) (discussing significant limitations on educational opportunities of low-
income children). 
 87. Barbara Fedders & Jason Langberg, School-Based Legal Services As a Tool in Dismantling the 
School-to-Prison Pipeline and Achieving Educational Equity, 13 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER  
& CLASS 212, 219, 222–23 (2013) (noting that over 20% of children live in poverty). 
 88. Osamudia R. James, Business As Usual: The Roberts Court’s Continued Neglect of Adequacy and 
Equity Concerns in American Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 793, 797–98 (2008); Ross Wiener, 
Opportunity Gaps: The Injustice Underneath Achievement Gaps in Our Public Schools, 85 N.C. L. REV. 
1315, 1316 (2007).  
 89. See SUSAN AUD ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 
2013, at 78–79 (2013), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013037.pdf. These “high-poverty” 
schools presently constitute around 20% of all schools and are increasing; id. at 79; see SUSAN 
AUD ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2010, at 82 (2010), 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010028.pdf; GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 
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schools struggle to recruit and retain qualified teachers.90 Facing multiple 
challenges of their own, parents in poverty are unable to contribute to the 
functioning and operation of the school in the same manner as parents not 
comparably disadvantaged. Students in these schools typically experience 
lower academic achievement, lower graduation rates, and less employment 
success than those in non-high-poverty schools.91 
The current funding structures of public education make it difficult for 
high-poverty schools to offset the deleterious impact of poverty on learning.92 
Because local property taxes are primary revenue sources for school districts,93 
disparities exist between property-rich and property-poor districts. These 
disparities have become more pronounced as socioeconomic segregation has 
increased.94 Districts with low property tax bases typically cannot generate the 
same revenue for schools as wealthier districts and thus cannot offset the 




matters-2005.pdf; James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE 
L.J. 2043, 2094–95 (2002). 
 90. Charles Clotfelter et al., High Poverty Schools and the Distribution of Teachers and Principals, 
85 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1356 (2007). 
 91. Levin, supra note 86, at 1389–95; Gregory J. Palardy, High School Socioeconomic Segregation 
and Student Attainment, 50 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 714, 715 (2013); Russell W. Rumberger, Parsing the 
Data on Student Achievement in High-Poverty Schools, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1293, 1306 (2007). While some 
high-poverty schools defy these trends, studies suggest that public schools that do not have private 
funding sources and that cannot select their students, as charter schools can, do not sustain 
success over the long term. See Fedders & Langberg, supra note 87, at 225 (citing Richard D. 
Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1545, 1547–48 (2007)). 
 92. Laurie Reynolds, Uniformity of Taxation and the Preservation of Local Control in School Finance 
Reform, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1835, 1838–40 (2007). 
 93. Id. at 1840 n.11 (citing a study that showed that, “[n]ationally, local revenues account 
for 43.5% of total public school expenditures,” but also noting discrepancies in how much local 
property tax reliance exists in each state); see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EQUITY AND ADEQUACY 
IN EDUCATION FINANCE 1 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999). 
 94. See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE 
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 95–96 (2004) (describing that socioeconomic segregation 
intensified after World War II when Americans left urban centers and settled in homogeneous 
suburbs); Reynolds, supra note 92, at 1840 n.12 (noting that “many school funding systems were 
created in the nineteenth century to finance schools in predominantly rural communities” when 
“population and property wealth were distributed more evenly” and that, “[a]s a result the local 
property tax produced far less inequality than it does today, since American communities are now 
heavily segregated along socioeconomic lines”). 
 95. Reynolds, supra note 92, at 1838 n.5 (noting a General Accounting Survey finding that, 
“on average, wealthy districts spend at least 24% per-pupil more than poor districts”); see also 
Erika K. Wilson, Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public Education, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. 1416, 1444–45 (2014) (arguing that “gross fiscal disparities persist between neighboring 
school districts” because “districts . . . encompass[ing] higher valued property can levy taxes at a 
lower rate yet still collect large sums of money while . . . districts . . . encompass[ing] lower valued 
property must levy taxes at a higher rate but still collect less [revenue]”). 
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unequal funding formulas in some states,96 and notwithstanding federal 
funding to supplement funds available to students in low-income schools,97 it 
remains the case that schools have been unable to obtain funding that might 
offset the impact of poverty on learning.98  
In addition to regressive tax structures, the inability or unwillingness of 
districts to implement student assignment plans that create socioeconomic 
integration has been another barrier to poor students taking full advantage 
of the promise of public education. The most effective means of assisting low-
income students has proven over time to be socioeconomic integration of a 
school.99 Students’ academic achievement correlates with the background 
and aspirations of the other students in the school.100 Research makes clear 
that one of the best ways to improve academic achievement of low-income 
students is to integrate them into majority middle-class schools.101 What is 
more, because Black students are disproportionately likely to be poor,102 
poverty and race can combine to hamper educational outcomes.103 Thus, 
while states and school districts have not prevented the enrollment in schools 
of students in poverty as they once did for Black students and students with 
disabilities, poverty nonetheless functions to exclude poor students from 
achieving the full promise of public education.  
 
 96. See infra notes 262–74 and accompanying text. 
 97. See infra notes 306–08 and accompanying text. 
 98. Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the Poor: 
New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY? RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, 
AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES 91, 91 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011) 
(describing that economic status predicts economic success). 
 99. Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the Constitutional Right to 
Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 429–30, 437 (2012) (discussing study data that revealed that 
school districts with a racially equitable distribution of middle income students had smaller 
achievement gaps than districts with inequitable distributions); see also KAHLENBERG, supra note 
32, at 48–58. 
 100. Black, supra note 99, at 437–39. 
 101. Ryan & Heise, supra note 89, at 2106.  
 102. Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of 
the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1473 (2007) (“Latino and Black students comprise 80% of the 
student population in extreme poverty schools (90 to 100% poor) . . . .” (quoting GARY ORFIELD 
& CHUNGMEI LEE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND 
EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 21 (2005))). 
 103. MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PROSPECTS: FINAL REPORT ON STUDENT 
OUTCOMES 12 (1997) (“School poverty depresses the scores of all students in schools where at 
least half of the students are eligible for subsidized lunch, and seriously depresses the scores when 
over 75 percent of students live in low-income households.”). 
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III. THE “UNDESERVING CHILD” AND THE NORMALIZATION OF 
CONTEMPORARY EXCLUSION 
A. HALTING STATE-SANCTIONED, GROUP-BASED EXCLUSION  
Over the past six decades, courts and legislatures have taken important 
steps to counteract the most blatant forms of intentional exclusion based on 
race, ethnicity, and disability.104 De jure racial segregation is now 
impermissible.105 In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas 
statute that denied enrollment to undocumented immigrant children.106 In 
1997, Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(“IDEA”), which requires states to provide a free appropriate public 
education to all students with disabilities in the least restrictive 
environment.107 These legal precedents and statutes constitute legal tools 
advocates have used to counter exclusion based on race and disability. While 
imperfect measures for insuring meaningful and widespread inclusion,108 
 
 104. See generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION (2004) (summarizing limitations of equity efforts). 
 105. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 106. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 238 (1982) (“[V]isiting . . . condemnation on the head of 
an infant for the misdeeds of the parents is illogical, unjust, and contrary to the basic concept of 
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or 
wrongdoing” (quotation omitted)). 
 107. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 108. Numerous commentators have noted the lingering effects of de jure segregation and bans on 
students with disabilities. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, REVIVING THE GOAL OF AN 
INTEGRATED SOCIETY: A 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE 9–13 (2009), https://www.civilrightsproject. 
ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/reviving-the-goal-of-an-integrated-
society-a-21st-century-challenge/orfield-reviving-the-goal-mlk-2009.pdf; Osamudia James, Opt-Out 
Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1088; (2015); Ryan & Heise, supra 
note 89, at 2095; RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SEGREGATION THEN, 
SEGREGATION SINCE (2013), http://www.epi.org/publication/unfinished-march-public-school-
segregation. An exploration of the causes of and impacts of the failure of case law and statutes to 
ameliorate the causes and impacts of race and disability-based exclusion is beyond the scope of this 
Article. For a discussion, see Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield, Racial Inequity in Special Education, in RACIAL 
INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, at xv, xxiii (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002) (“[T]rends 
include the following: (a) pronounced and persistent racial disparities in identification between 
[W]hite and [B]lack children in the categories of [intellectual disability] and emotional disturbance, 
compared with far less disparity in the category of specific learning disabilities; (b) a minimal degree 
of racial disparity in medically diagnosed disabilities [such as deafness, blindness, and orthopedic 
impairment] as compared with subjective cognitive disabilities; (c) dramatic differences in the 
incidence of disability from one state to the next; and (d) gross disparities between [B]lacks and 
Hispanics, and between [B]lack boys and girls, in identification rates for the categories of [intellectual 
disability] and emotionally disturbed.”). See 1 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 27TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, 2005, at 47–48 (2007), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2005/parts-b-c/27th-vol-1.pdf (discussing data 
for students ages 6 to 21, and noting that “[b]lack students with disabilities were . . . . more likely to be 
educated in separate environments” (emphasis omitted)); Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, 
and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1419 (2011) (discussing the 
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they nonetheless express an important repudiation of the notion that Black 
students and students with disabilities are undeserving of enrollment. 
B. PERSISTENCE OF THE TROPE OF THE UNDESERVING CHILD  
While the state-sanctioned barring of students based on classifications of 
race and disability has ended,109 school districts seem not to have fully 
abandoned the idea that students from these groups are undeserving of 
education. Contemporary school exclusionary practices tend to be justified 
on the basis that they are a response to student misbehavior, as well as to 
personal and family circumstances of students seen as troubling.110 Yet while 
many if not most students engage in in-school misbehavior, the students 
bearing the brunt of the new exclusion are disproportionately from the same 
groups formerly barred: African-American students and students with 
disabilities. 
In removing students from school, whether through suspension or 
transfer to a separate and inferior educational setting, school districts are 
engaging in a form of sorting that is familiar from other areas of social policy. 
In health care,111 and in the distribution of welfare payments and food 
stamps,112 private and public actors seem to engage in a practice of arranging 
individuals on a continuum of deserving and not deserving in order to justify 
the grant or withholding of benefits.  
For example, studies indicate that emergency-room doctors are less likely 
to prescribe needed pain medications to young Black men hurt while involved 
in an encounter with law enforcement than they are to young men who sustain 
injuries in organized sports.113 Experts suggest that long-standing beliefs 
about the higher tolerance for pain of Black people, combined with biased 
attitudes on the part of treating health professionals toward Black male 
 
limitations of IDEA and private enforcement. See generally CLOTFELTER, supra note 104 (summarizing 
limitations of equity efforts).  
 109. But see generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW (2017) (detailing ongoing 
discrimination based on de jure segregation).  
 110. See infra Part III.C.  
 111. See Mary Crossley, Black Health Matters: Disparities, Community Health, and Interest 
Convergence, 22 MICH. J. RACE & L. 53, 60 (2016) (“Health inequality for Black people and other 
minorities is pervasive—it permeates measures of health care access, health status, and health 
outcomes.”); Ruqalijah Yearby, Breaking the Cycle of “Unequal Treatment” With Health Care Reform: 
Acknowledging and Addressing the Continuation of Racial Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1291 (2012) 
(noting pervasive and ongoing disparities between African Americans and whites in health status 
and access to care because of racial bias). 
 112. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDERSERVING POOR 102–03 (1989) (discussing early 
efforts to tie welfare programs to work requirements).  
 113. Susan W. Hinze et al., Hurt Running from Police? No Chance of (Pain) Relief: The Social Construction 
of Deserving Patients in Emergency Departments, 27 RES. SOC. HEALTH CARE 235, 254 (2009).  
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patients, help to explain this phenomenon.114 That is, notions that these 
patients are less deserving animate disparate treatment.115  
The government’s response to poverty is similarly inflected with 
considerations of worthiness.116 In the early part of the 19th century, for 
example, “poor laws” conditioned aid receipt on crude distinctions between 
the deserving (old and ill) and undeserving (nearly everyone else) poor.117 
Those in the latter group were not entitled to any assistance, no matter how 
difficult their economic circumstances.118 Unless one was very old or very sick, 
the condition of poverty was seen as a moral failing.119 Over a century later, 
single mothers assumed the status of undeserving, as attacks on Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) become politically expedient.120  
Ironically, Plyler v. Doe,121 a case celebrated as a “high water mark of 
immigrant rights in the U.S,”122 makes a similar rhetorical space for exclusion 
based on notions of blameworthiness.123 In its ruling, the Court notes that the 
children in the plaintiff class had done nothing wrong, describing them as 
“innocent children.”124 
[The Texas statute denying enrollment to undocumented children] 
is directed against children, and imposes its discriminatory burden 
on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have 
little control. It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification 
for penalizing these children . . . .125 
 The implicit reference to blameworthiness finds echoes in the new 
exclusion. Misbehavior—even developmentally normative misbehavior—
 
 114. See, e.g, Carlos Ballesteros, Racism Might Have Spared Black and Latino Communities from 
Drug Abuse, Expert Says, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 17, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/racism-opiod-
epidemic-blacks-latinos-trump-704370 (Dr. Andrew Kolobny, co-director of opioid policy 
research at the Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University stated: 
“‘[We know] that doctors prescribe narcotics more cautiously to their non-white patients,’ he said 
on NPR on Saturday. ‘It would seem that if the patient is black, the doctor is more concerned 
about the patient becoming addicted, or maybe they’re more concerns about the patient selling 
their pills, or maybe they are less concerned about pain in that population.’”). 
 115. Hinze et al., supra note 113, at 252–53.  
 116. See KATZ, supra note 112, at 26–28.  
 117. See id. at 5.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 6–7. 
 120. Id. at 68–69. 
 121. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982). 
 122. Kevin Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community in the 
Twentieth Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 44 (1995). 
 123. Professor Raquel Aldana argues that, indeed, once undocumented students move 
beyond high school, it is “as if, suddenly, they inherited their parent’s ‘illegality,’ and with it, the 
subordination of law.” Introduction: The Subordination and Anti-Subordination Story of the U.S. 
Immigrant Story in the Twenty-First Century, 7 NEV. L.J. 713, 728 (2007). 
 124. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224. 
 125. Id. at 220. 
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along with difficult personal and family circumstances now function to keep 
students out of regular public school. To be sure, contemporary school 
districts likely do not think of themselves as “blaming” students; these policies 
instead are steeped in the language of educational administration and 
theories of pedagogy. And suspensions and AEP transfers are not the same 
kind of systematic, group-based exclusion in which states are now prohibited 
from engaging. Yet their impact on individually affected students works a 
similar kind of harm.  
C. MISBEHAVIOR-BASED EXCLUSION 
Over the last twenty years, in-school misbehavior by students has spurred 
a new and widespread set of exclusionary practices: suspension and expulsion. 
Suspension is the temporary removal of a student from the regular 
educational setting for a violation of school policies or rules.126 During a 
suspension, a student may not attend school for a specified length of time, 
which can vary from days to weeks.127 Expulsion is a longer removal of a 
student from the regular educational setting for a major rule infraction. The 
length of and reasons for expulsion vary by state and school district.128 Some 
expulsions result in a complete cessation of educational services.129 Other 
expelled students receive educational services in an alternative setting 
pursuant to local policies.130  
In the 2011–2012 school year, the most recent for which nationwide data 
are available, 3.3 million students—nearly 7% of the total number of enrolled 
students131—were suspended at least once, while over 100,000 students were 
 
 126. Suspension, NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON SUPPORTIVE SCH. DISCIPLINE, http://supportiveschool 
discipline.org/learn/reference-guides/suspension (last visited Dec. 27, 2017) (citing CIVIL RIGHTS 
DATA COLLECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., MASTER LIST OF 2015–2016 CRDC DEFINITIONS 12 (2016)).  
 127. Id. 
 128. Expulsion, NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON SUPPORTIVE SCH. DISCIPLINE, http://supportive 
schooldiscipline.org/learn/reference-guides/expulsion (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
 129. The Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) refers to this as “Expulsion without educational 
services,” defined as “an action taken by the local educational agency of removing a child from 
his/her regular school for disciplinary purposes, and not providing educational services to the 
child for the remainder of the school year or longer in accordance with local educational agency 
policy.” CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, supra note 126, at 9–10. OCR collects this data and 
publishes in the Civil Rights Data Collection (“CRDC”). Per the most recent national estimation 
published by OCR, 40,989 students were expelled without education services. See OFFICE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION 2011–12, https://ocrdata. 
ed.gov/downloads/projections/2011-12/States/National%20Totals.xls. 
 130. CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, supra note 126, at 9. For a discussion of expelled 
students in AEPs, see infra notes 292–96 and accompanying text. 
 131. CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, 2011–12 STATE AND NATIONAL ESTIMATIONS, 
http://ocrdata.ed.gov/StateNationalEstimations/Estimations_2011_12 (noting that the total 
enrollment of students nationwide during the 2011–2012 school year was estimated at 
49,605,534) (select “Student Enrollment,” then “Enrollment” to download an excel spreadsheet; 
select “Overall Enrollment” on the Excel spreadsheet). 
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expelled.132 Nearly 50% of expelled students were completely denied 
educational services.133 These numbers have significantly increased in the past 
two decades. 134  
This increase in suspensions is based not on more, or more serious, 
student misbehavior, but instead on schools expanding the range of behaviors 
permitting or requiring suspension.135 The principal source of these policy 
changes is the 1994 federal Gun Free Schools Act (“GFSA”).136 Enacted 
amidst that decade’s “moral panic”137 about school shooters and juvenile 
crime,138 the GFSA required states to impose a one-year expulsion for any 
student found in school with a firearm.139 The statute represented a validation 
by the federal government of the concept of “zero tolerance” in school 
disciplinary practices.140 Borrowed from a law-enforcement approach,141 zero 
tolerance “mandates the application of predetermined consequences, most 
often severe and punitive in nature, that are intended to be applied regardless 
of the gravity of behavior, mitigating circumstances, or situational context.”142  
Many states and schools have adopted laws and policies, modeled after 
the GFSA’s zero-tolerance approach, that impose suspension or expulsion for 
 
 132. Id.; see also NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON SUPPORTIVE SCH. DISCIPLINE, supra note 128. 
 133. See CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, supra note 131. 
 134. Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. L. REV. 823, 
835–36 (2015). 
 135. See CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL 
REFORM 78–79 (2010). 
 136. Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, § 14601, 108 Stat. 3907 (codified as 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (2012)).  
 137. In Folk Devils & Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers, Stanley Cohen offered 
the foundational definition of moral panic:  
(i) Concern (rather than fear) about the potential or imagined threat; (ii) Hostility – moral 
outrage towards the actors (folk devils) who embody the problem . . . ; (iii) Consensus – a 
widespread agreement (not necessarily total) that the threat exists, is serious and that 
‘something should be done’ . . . . (iv) Disproportionality – an exaggeration of the number 
or strength of the cases, in terms of the damage caused, moral offensiveness, potential 
risk if ignored. . . . (v) Volatility – the panic erupts and dissipates suddenly and without 
warning.  
STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS & MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS AND ROCKERS, at 
xxvi–xxvii (Routledge 3d. ed. 2002) (1972).  
 138. Alicia C. Insley, Suspending and Expelling Children from Educational Opportunity: Time to 
Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1058–61 (2001). See generally Ronald 
Burns & Charles Crawford, School Shootings, the Media, and Public Fear: Ingredients for a Moral Panic, 
32 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 147 (1999) (summarizing empirical data to argue that schools are 
in fact extremely safe places for children). 
 139. 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b). 
 140. Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 919, 
932 (2016). 
 141. Id. at 933. 
 142. Id. (quoting Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools? An Evidentiary Review and 
Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 852, 852 (2008)).  
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a range of offenses that extend beyond those mandated by the statute.143 
These include a multitude of comparatively minor offenses, including 
possession of alcohol and tobacco, fighting, and dress-code violations.144 For 
example, under a zero-tolerance policy, an Indiana school suspended a 
student for a full school year for “inserting the ‘f-word’ multiple times in a 
single sentence” on the Internet—“even though he did not direct his 
language toward” any particular individual and the post was made “in the 
middle of the night” while he was at home.145 Zero-tolerance policies have also 
resulted in the suspension of a “middle school student who brought an over-
the-counter medicine to school to treat an illness, [a] six year old who ate his 
lunch with his beloved cub scout tool, and [a] girl whose first aid kit in her 
car contained a small knife.”146  
Exclusion for misbehavior is arguably a less troubling form of exclusion 
than those discussed in the previous Part. The justification for exclusion 
seems more compelling—the child, after all, is not technically blameless, and 
the exclusion is not based on a group classification as in the case of race and 
disability but on the seemingly volitional act of misbehavior.147 
In addition to seeming more justifiable, this form of exclusion also 
appears less egregious in the degree of harm it inflicts on the student. After 
all, suspension is not a permanent removal from school or consignment to a 
substandard setting. However, even when the removal from school is short in 
duration, the negative impact of suspension on a student can be long lasting. 
Studies indicate that roughly 40% of the student suspensions in any school 
year are issued against students who have already been suspended at least 
once.148 In Texas, for example, “students who were suspended . . . just once 
during middle or high school were subsequently suspended . . . on median, 
three more times.”149 Multiple suspensions for the same child do not 
necessarily occur because the child is incorrigibly misbehaving; instead, as 
indicated by key longitudinal studies, suspension reinforces both a student’s 
poor behavior and a teacher’s subjective perception that the child is 
inherently a troublemaker.150 “[S]uspension becomes a predictor, rather than 
a deterrent, of later suspension and discipline problems.”151 
 
 143. Id. at 933. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Black, supra note 134, at 836. 
 146. Id. at 837. 
 147. Recent developments in neuroscience suggest adolescents in fact have less control over 
their behavior than was once thought. See Barbara Fedders & Jason Langberg, School Discipline 
Reform: Incorporating the Supreme Court’s “Age Matters” Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 933, 935 
(2013) (summarizing Supreme Court jurisprudence citing neuroscience in finding juveniles 
categorically less culpable than adults). 
 148. Black, supra note 134, at 833. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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Removing a student from school decreases the chances that she will 
graduate or enroll in college.152 Not graduating from high school leads to a 
host of other problems, including an increased likelihood of unemployment, 
substance abuse, and poverty.153 Finally, suspension can trigger or exacerbate 
juvenile or criminal court involvement.154  
Along with the significant and serious harm from what seems to be a 
short-term form of exclusion, the justification for the exclusion reveals itself 
upon closer examination often to be thin. Few would dispute that engaging 
in violence at school that poses a threat to other students or teachers could 
warrant a student’s removal from a regular educational setting for some 
period of time. However, in-school violence constitutes a small percentage of 
student misbehavior.155 In fact, data suggest that students are less violent in 
school now than in the past.156 Today, “schools . . . report that [relatively] 
minor misbehaviors, like disruption and disrespect, account for ninety-five 
percent of suspensions and expulsions.”157  
Furthermore, evidence suggests that the new exclusion has roots in 
school districts’ resistance to court-ordered desegregation. In the aftermath 
of Brown, reports of discipline problems were more common in racially 
integrating schools than in single-race schools, white or Black.158 In newly 
integrating schools, Black students were two to three times more likely to be 
suspended from school than whites.159 Advocates noted multiple instances of 
 
 152. See Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools for Change, 48 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 313, 321 (2016) (summarizing studies indicating correlation between suspension and 
dropping out). 
 153. See FABELO ET AL., supra note 10, at 61–72 (discussing positive correlations between 
suspension and contact with the juvenile justice system); Comm. on Sch. Health, Am. Acad. of 
Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Organizational Principles to Guide and Define the Child Health Care System 
and/or Improve the Health of All Children—Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion, 112 PEDIATRICS 
1206, 1207 (2003) (noting that students subjected to out-of-school suspensions are more likely 
to commit crime, get in fights, use illicit substances, have sexual intercourse, and are more 
susceptible to suicidal tendencies); Catherine Y. Kim, Procedures for Public Law Remediation in 
School-to-Prison Pipeline Litigation: Lessons Learned from Antoine v. Winner School District, 54 N.Y. 
L. SCH. L. REV. 955, 956 (2009/10) (“Being suspended or expelled from school increases the 
likelihood of failing a grade, dropping out, engaging in criminal activity, or later incarceration.”). 
 154. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW “ZERO TOLERANCE” AND 
HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 18–19 (2010), https:// 
b.3cdn.net/advancement/d05cb2181a4545db07_r2im6caqe.pdf; BUREAU OF RESEARCH & PLANNING, 
FLA. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY IN FLORIDA’S SCHOOLS: AN EIGHT-YEAR STUDY 14 
(2013), http://www.iacpyouth.org/Portals/0/Resources/FloridaDelinquency.pdf; Katayoon Majd, 
Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 HOW. L.J. 343, 347–48 (2011) (discussing the school-to-
prison pipeline).  
 155. Black, supra note 134, at 835. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 825. 
 158. ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST ET AL., A PROFILE OF THE LARGE-CITY HIGH SCHOOL, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS BULLETIN 76 (1971). 
 159. Brief of the NAACP and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 3–4, Goss v. Lopez 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (No. 73-898), 1974 WL 185916. 
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school staff, resistant to integration mandates, treating Black children 
differently and escalating conflicts when they occurred.160 Today, evidence 
suggests that bias continues to affect the decision-making process preceding 
a suspension or expulsion. 17% of Black school children are suspended at 
least once, compared with 5% of white children.161 Suspensions are also 
heavily concentrated in the South.162 Of the 1.2 million Black students 
suspended from K-12 schools, 55% occurred in 13 southern states.163 School 
districts in the South are also “responsible for 50% of Black student 
expulsions from public schools in the United States.”164 Furthermore, in 
2015, more than 13% of students with disabilities were suspended.165 This 
rate is approximately twice that of non-disabled students.166 While nationwide 
data are not disaggregated based on socioeconomic status, a study of public 
and charter schools in the District of Columbia demonstrates that suspensions 
are disproportionately likely to be administered to poor students.167 
Overwhelmingly, low-income Black students suffer the consequences of 
harsh exclusionary disciplinary policies not because they misbehave more, but 
because the schools they attend are disproportionately likely to rely on school 
exclusion to manage misbehavior.168 Black students are increasingly likely to 
 
 160. See, e.g., CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, SUSPENSIONS: ARE THEY HELPING CHILDREN? 13 
(1975), http://diglib.lib.utk.edu/cdf/data/0116_000050_000205/0116_000050_000205.pdf 
(noting disparate and unfair treatment of Black students and recounting incident in which a 
white teacher confiscated from a Black student a metal pick used to comb out Afro hair styles). 
 161. DANIEL J. LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DISPARATE 
IMPACT OF DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL 6 (2012), https://www.civilrightsproject. 
ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/federal-reports/ 
upcoming-ccrr-research/losen-gillespie-opportunity-suspended-2012.pdf (comparing suspension 
rate risks for different groups of students: “1 in 13 (8%) risk for Native Americans; 1 in 14 (7%) 
for Latinos; 1 in 20 (5%) for Whites; [and] 1 in 50 (2%) for Asian Americans”). 
 162. See LOSEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 6 (finding that the states with the highest rates of suspension 
for secondary students were Florida at 19%, and Alabama, South Carolina, and Mississippi at 16%).  
 163. EDWARD J. SMITH & SHAUN R. HARPER, DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF K-12 SCHOOL 
SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION ON BLACK STUDENTS IN SOUTHERN STATES 1 (2015), https:// 
equity.gse.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Smith_Harper_Report.pdf.  
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 3. 
 166. Id. 
 167. OFFICE OF THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUC., REDUCING OUT-OF-SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS 
AND EXPULSIONS IN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC AND PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 12 (2013), 
https://osse.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/osse/publication/attachments/OSSE_REPORT_ 
DISCIPLINARY_G_PAGES.pdf. 
 168. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter on the 
Nondiscriminatory Administration of School Discipline 4 (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi.pdf (“[I]n our investigations we have found 
cases where African-American students were disciplined more harshly and more frequently 
because of their race than similarly situated white students. In short, racial discrimination in 
school discipline is a real problem.”). See, e.g., Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty 
Trials: Biographical Racism, Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 
1566 n.29 (2004) (describing a Seattle study finding that controlling for the factors of “poverty 
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attend racially isolated schools.169 These schools are disproportionately likely 
to be poor.170 The educational harms caused by racially isolated, high-poverty 
schools play a significant role in both the behavior that students exhibit and 
the consequences they in turn receive.171 For example, students with acute 
and unaddressed educational needs may fall behind their peers or become 
disengaged with the educational process and act out as a result.172 Teachers 
and administrators at racially isolated high-poverty schools are more likely to 
respond to this kind of misbehavior with school suspension and expulsion.173 
Teachers and administrators in these schools often lack, or believe they lack, 
the resources to meet the needs of all of their students. As a result, they adopt 
an “exclusionary ethos,” preserving their limited resources for the students 
whom they believe are more deserving and have a better chance of success.174 
Other evidence suggests that suspensions disproportionately affect Black 
students because of lack of cultural awareness of teachers and administrators, 
different communication styles between white teachers and Black students, 
and a curriculum that fails to engage students.175  
 
and living in a single-parent family” did not eliminate disparities in the suspension and expulsion 
of African-American students); Russell Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and 
Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment, 34 URB. REV. 317, 335 (2002) (“What is especially clear 
is that neither this nor any previously published research studying differential discipline and rates 
of behavior by race has found any evidence that the higher rates of discipline received by African-
American students are due to more serious or more disruptive behavior.” (citations omitted)). 
 169. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF 
SEGREGATION (2006), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-
and-diversity/racial-transformation-and-the-changing-nature-of-segregation (describing how from the 
1980–1981 school year to the 2005–2006 school year, the percentage of Black students attending 
schools in which a majority of the students are minorities rose from 66% to 73%); Lindsey Cook, U.S. 
Education: Still Separate and Unequal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 28, 2015, 12:01 AM), http:// 
www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/01/28/us-education-still-separate-and-unequal 
(noting that in 2015 “[m]ore than 2 million black students attend[ed] schools where 90 percent of 
the student body [was] made up of minority students”). 
 170. Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2417, 2428 (2004). 
 171. Nance, supra note 152, at 326–27. 
 172. Id. at 324. 
 173. Pedro A. Noguera, Schools, Prisons, and Social Implications of Punishment: Rethinking 
Disciplinary Practices, 42 THEORY INTO PRAC. 341, 341–42 (2003). 
 174. Nance, supra note 140, at 945 (“[As] [t]eachers are often bereft of not only sufficient 
resources but also a cogent narrative of opportunity that can help them gain voluntary 
compliance from students . . . it is understandable that teachers and administrators often perceive 
little choice but to summon repressive means to swiftly remove disruptive students from the 
classroom and the school.” (alterations and omission in original) (quoting Paul J. Hirschfeld, 
Preparing for Prison?: The Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 
93 (2008))); see also Teresa Watanabe & Howard Blume, Why Some LAUSD Teachers Are Balking at a New 
Approach to Discipline Problems, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/ 
education/la-me-school-discipline-20151108-story.html (documenting teachers in Los Angeles 
Unified School District who assert attempts to implement more progressive, non-exclusionary 
disciplinary policies were ineffective largely because of insufficient resources and training). 
 175. See, e.g., Kate McGee, Why Do Black Students Get More Suspensions? Here Are 3 Possible 
Reasons, KUT (May 20, 2014), http://kut.org/post/why-do-black-students-get-more-suspensions-
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D. ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS 
In addition to suspending students, school districts over the past twenty 
years increasingly have relied on separate and typically inferior schools or 
programs to deal with students they deem troubled or troubling. These AEPs 
are defined by the U.S. Department of Education as schools and programs for 
students at risk of educational failure.176 For the 2007–2008 school year, 64% 
of school districts reported having at least one such program.177 This figure 
represents an increase of 25% from the 2000–2001 school year, and is 
dramatically higher than the estimated 464 such programs nationwide in 
1973.178 Districts in southeastern states are particularly likely to have 
alternative schools, as are urban districts, high-poverty districts, and districts 
with high concentrations of minority students.179 Well over half  a million 
students attend AEPs each year.180  
1. The Child as the Problem 
In contrast to earlier alternative educational experiments, which 
identified students’ academic struggles as arising not from their own flaws and 
weaknesses but instead from uninspiring curricula or overly rigid teachers,181 
AEPs typically embody no pedagogical critique of mainstream public 
education.182 State laws defining alternative education establish criteria that 
make a student eligible. The criteria typically are vague, thus conferring 
significant discretion on schools to decide which students they believe can 
 
here-are-3-possible-reasons (featuring an interview with education professors Dr. Daudi Abe and 
Dr. Richard Reddick).  
 176. CARVER ET AL., supra note 8, at 3. 
 177. Id.  
 178. BRIAN KLEINER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS AND 
PROGRAMS FOR STUDENTS AT RISK OF EDUCATION FAILURE: 2000–01, at 5 (2002) (showing 39% 
of schools had alternative school programs); LES CARNINE & JOSHUA H. BARNETT, ALTERNATIVE 
EDUCATION: A CONTINUED EXAMINATION OF HOW STATES ARE ADDRESSING ALTERNATIVE 
EDUCATION IN THEIR SCHOOLS 2 (2004) (“The federal government got involved in 1973 when 
only 464 identifiable alternative programs existed.”). 
 179. CARVER ET AL., supra note 8, at 5. 
 180. Id. at 7. “There were 646,500 students enrolled in public school districts attending 
alternative schools and programs for at-risk students in 2007–08.”Id. at 3. 
 181. See MARY MAGEE QUINN & JEFFREY M. POIRIER, AM. INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, STUDY OF 
EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS: FINAL GRANT REPORT 1 (2006) (citing a newsletter 
of the Central Park East Secondary School in New York, an earlier, progressive alternative school, 
stating: “[i]t is our school and its way of teaching that is alternative, not [the] students”). 
 182. See Jeong-Hee Kim & Kay Ann Taylor, Rethinking Alternative Education to Break the Cycle of 
Educational Inequality and Inequity, 101 J. EDUC. RES. 207, 207, 212 (2008) (describing 
contemporary AEPs as reflecting a “deficit-thinking paradigm” that ignores systemic factors such 
as “[s]chool tracking, inequalities in school financing, curriculum differentiation, and low 
teacher quality”). 
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and should be removed from regular public school.183 Some state statutes 
simply establish that AEPs are for “at-risk” students without defining the 
term.184 Others define the term by reference to academic performance or a 
history of truancy.185 A student’s living situation—homelessness, a prior 
placement in a child welfare or juvenile justice facility, or unstable housing 
because of multiple child welfare placements or changes in custody—can 
subject her to an AEP assignment.186 Pregnancy and parenting may do the 
same.187 In at least one state, students who are refugees and of limited English 
proficiency are automatically assigned to AEPs.188 The behaviors triggering 
AEP assignment include the oft-cited, vague category of in-school 
“disruption,”189 as well as off-campus incidents that result in delinquency or 
criminal charges, regardless of whether the charges result in conviction.190 A 
small number of states permit expelled students to attend AEPs; an even 
 
 183. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-20-2303(2) (West 2017) (“‘Alternative learning 
environment’ means a student intervention program in compliance with § 6-48-101 et seq. that 
seeks to eliminate traditional barriers to learning for students.”). 
 184. See, e.g., IDAHO ADMIN. CODE 08.02.03.110 (2009) (“Alternative secondary programs 
are those that provide special instructional courses and offer special services to eligible at-risk 
youth. . . .”). 
 185. See, e.g., Alternative Education, MASS. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., 
http://www.doe.mass.edu/alted (last visited Dec. 27, 2017) (“‘At-risk’ students may include 
those who are pregnant/parenting teens, truant students, and suspended or expelled students, 
returned dropouts, delinquent youth, or other students who are not meeting local promotional 
requirements.”).  
 186. See CARVER ET AL., supra note 8, at 1, 4; PATRICK KEATON, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
SELECTED STATISTICS FROM THE COMMON CORE OF DATA: SCHOOL YEAR 2011–12 app. B (2013), 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013441.pdf; Michelle Reichard-Huff & Perry A. Zirkel, 
Commentary, State Laws for Alternative Education: An Updated Policy Analysis, 305 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 
14 (2014). 
 187. MASS. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 185. 
 188. See Complaint at 1, Khadidja Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, (2016) (No. 16-03881) 2016 
WL 3912989. 
 189. CARVER ET AL., supra note 8, at 4; see, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.2(2)(C) (2013) 
(“[A]lternative education programs” are for “students who are unmotivated[,] . . . unsuccessful[,] 
. . . [or] disruptive . . . . Alternative programs may include but not be limited to programs that 
hold students to strict standards of behavior in highly structured and controlled environments, 
sometimes referred to as ‘boot camps’, ‘police schools’, or ‘court schools’.”). 
 190. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.006 (West 2012) (requiring placement of students 
in disciplinary alternative education when, inter alia, “the superintendent or the superintendent’s 
designee has a reasonable belief that the student has engaged in a conduct defined as a felony 
offense in Title 5, Penal Code”). 
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smaller number require them to do so.191 Available data192 suggest that the 
population of AEPs is divided between students seen as having troubling 
personal circumstances and those exhibiting behaviors deemed problematic, 
and that these categories overlap.193  
2. Inferior by Design 
The settings and characteristics of AEPs create a distinct impression that 
the children assigned to them are undeserving of a typical public-school 
education. Most AEPs do not look like typical schools.194 Only 37% of AEPs 
are housed within regular schools or are separate schools; the rest are housed 
within other facilities.195 17% of the non-school-based group utilize online 
instruction as the sole means of education—regardless of students’ ability or 
need.196 For students in school-based AEPs, books may be unavailable,197 and 
extracurricular opportunities are typically nonexistent.198 In Georgia, the 
state houses AEP programs in poor-quality buildings that formerly served as 
schools for Black students during the time of de jure segregation.199 Students 
in AEPs express frustration at being denied some of the basic elements of a 
 
 191. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48915(f) (West 2013) (providing alternative education to students 
who are expelled); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-233d(d) (West 2010) (providing alternative 
education to all students under age sixteen while expelled, but for students who are sixteen or 
older, providing it only if the students meet certain conditions imposed by the local or regional 
school board); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.1(b) (West 2014) (authorizing the placement of a 
student who brings a firearm or dangerous weapon to school in an alternative education 
program); MO. REV. STAT. § 167.164 (2016) (making clear that suspensions and expulsions do 
not relieve the state of its duty to educate students); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-2.2 (West 2013) 
(requiring the placement of any student who commits an assault at school or brings a weapon to 
school in an alternative education program or, if none is available, in home-bound instruction); 
16 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-27 (West 2016) (requiring each school district to establish 
continued education for students suspended for longer than ten days or who are chronically 
absent); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.008(a) (West 2012) (requiring each school district to create 
a disciplinary alternative education program). 
 192. The data set on AEPs is slim, not comprehensive, and inconclusive, given the differences 
in alternative education from state to state and the minimal reporting requirements for AEPs. See 
Lehr et al., supra note 5, at 22.  
 193. Id. at 27 (suggesting that states may be increasingly using AEPs for disruptive students); 
Reichard-Huff & Zirkel, supra note 186, at 20 (“The most prevalent—and overlapping—
populations are students who are suspended or expelled from their home school districts and 
students who disrupt the general education environment.”). 
 194. See Reichard-Huff & Zirkel, supra note 186, at 6 (explaining how AEPs contain students 
with at-risk behaviors such as truancy or dropping out, past suspension or expulsion from 
traditional schools, disruptive tendencies, lack of success in regular school settings, and referrals 
to the juvenile justice or court system). 
 195. CARVER ET AL., supra note 8, at 3. 
 196. Id.; Letter from Educ. Law Ctr. to Anurima Bhargava 6 (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.elc-
pa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ELC_DOJ_AEDYComplaint_8_7_13.pdf. 
 197. ACLU, supra note 17, at 37–38. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. 
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typical school experience—lockers, yearbooks, sports teams and school 
dances.200 Surveillance cameras, police officers, and daily searches—common 
features of  AEPs—combine to turn an already stigmatizing experience201 into 
a correctional one.202 While some AEPs utilize positive behavioral supports 
and other non-punitive forms of discipline,203 most deal with in-school 
misbehavior punitively, through suspensions and referrals of students to the 
juvenile and criminal systems.204 Although students in AEPs have been 
identified as “at risk,” school districts typically do not provide sufficient 
supports and services to assist them. Only 14 states provide for counseling 
services in AEPs.205  
The perception that AEP students are less deserving is further reflected 
in the statutes and regulations that govern them. Compulsory attendance 
laws, intended to ensure that students receive the benefits of education 
articulated in the common-school movement and affirmed by courts, do not 
apply to all AEP students.206 Moreover, state regulatory schemes on curricula, 
instruction, and teacher certification requirements frequently incorporate 
explicitly or implicitly lower standards for AEPs than for traditional schools.207 
These regulatory regimes can be grouped into three categories.208 
 
 200. On the lack of extracurricular activities at AEPs, see Audrey Knight, Redefining Punishment for 
Students: Nevares v. San Marcos I.S.D., 20 REV. LITIG. 777, 791, 794–95 (2001).  
 201. See Derek W. Black, In Defense of Voluntary Desegregation: All Things Are Not Equal, 44 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 107, 125 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court has articulated stigma as an 
independent harm and basis for standing in key race discrimination cases).  
 202. See, e.g., Verified Second Amended Complaint—Class Action at 36, M.H. v. Atlanta 
Indep. Sch. Sys., 2009 WL 10674830 (N.D. Ga. 2009) 1:08-cv-01435-BBM. 
 203. QUINN & POIRIER, supra note 181, at 47.  
 204. See, e.g., Complaint at 1–2, A.M. v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Bd. of Trs., No. 3:11 CV 344 TSL-MTP 
(S.D. Miss. June 8, 2011) (alleging that students were shackled and handcuffed to a railing for 
violations of minor school rules); ACLU, supra note 17, at 42 (noting AEP in DeSoto County, Mississippi 
that employed a policy of prohibiting students from exchanging personal information—addresses, 
phone numbers, and emails—with each other or “solicit[ing] friendships with other students”); TONY 
FABELO ET AL., supra note 10, at 21–22; JASON LANGBERG, ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION IN NORTH 
CAROLINA: A REPORT ON ALTERNATIVE LEARNING PROGRAMS IN NORTH CAROLINA DURING THE  
2013–14 SCHOOL YEAR 14–15 (2015), http://youthjusticenc.org/download/education-justice/ 
prevention-intervention-alternatives/ALP%20Report-Final.pdf (noting that alternative learning 
programs suspend students at rates significantly higher than do traditional public schools). 
Notwithstanding the strict discipline policies and law enforcement presence, schools report high 
rates of crime plague some AEPs. A complaint filed by the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf 
of students at an Atlanta AEP alleged rampant violence at the school, including instances of staff 
members physically assaulting students. Verified Second Amended Complaint—Class Action, supra 
note 202, at 4. 
 205. POROWSKI ET AL., supra note 9, at 8, 11.  
 206. Id. at 15–17. For an example of such a law, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3402(c) (2016) 
(“Attendance in an alternative school shall be voluntary unless the local board of education 
adopts a policy mandating attendance in either instance.”). 
 207. See infra notes 209–13 and accompanying text. 
 208. See, e.g., Reichard-Huff & Zirkel, supra note 186, at 20. 
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The first category establishes explicitly lower standards for AEPs. 
Tennessee, which falls into this category, has adopted statutes and 
administrative regulations specific to AEPs that are decidedly less rigorous 
than those that apply to traditional schools.209 The state requires only that 
classroom instruction in AEPs “shall be as nearly as practicable in accordance 
with the instructional program in the student’s regular school,”210 but even 
this minimal goal is often unachieved.211 Similarly, several other states have 
enacted statutory exceptions to the minimum number of instructional hours 
otherwise required in public schools.212 School districts in some states even 
assign teachers to alternative schools as punishment for unspecified 
infractions.213  
The second category outlines standards, but leaves them largely advisory. 
One state in this category, North Carolina, enacted laws requiring state and 
local boards of education to develop standards for AEPs.214 However, much of 
the law is advisory rather than mandatory.215 One statute “urges” boards of 
education to refrain from assigning substandard teachers to alternative 
schools, but does not actually bar them from doing so.216 Perhaps as a result 
of the advisory nature of such statutes, the administrative standards in North 
Carolina are very broad, including such generalities as “[h]ave highly 
qualified and effective faculty and staff.”217  
Finally, the third category prescribes no specific standards for AEPs.218 
For example, Connecticut has no standards whatsoever for alternative 
 
 209. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3405(a)(1) (standardized testing); TENN. COMP. R.  
& REGS. 0520-01-02-.09(2)(a) (2017) (curriculum); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0520-01-02-.09(2)(f) 
(teacher certification). 
 210. TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0520-01-02-.09(2)(a). 
 211. JOHN G. MORGAN, TENNESSEE’S ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS 26 (2005), http://comptroller. 
tn.gov/repository/RE/final_alt_school.pdf (“[M]ost alternative school programs attempt to model the 
core curriculum of the regular school system. However, the inability to provide comparable instruction 
. . . is a problem. . . . Providing course offerings other than core subject instruction is challenging for 
alternative schools, mostly because of shortages of teachers, space, money, and technology.”). 
 212. Georgia, for example, grants waivers from state requirements setting the minimum 
number of instructional hours “and the awarding of course credit.” KIM ET AL., supra note 135, at 
107. Similarly, Pennsylvania school districts are permitted to reduce by seven hours per week the 
instructional hours available to AEP students. Educ. Law Ctr., supra note 196, at 5–6. By contrast, 
“[28] states legislatively mandate that alternative schools and programs comply with core-curriculum 
content standards or standards adopted by the state.” KIM ET AL., supra note 135, at 107. 
 213. ACLU, supra note 17, at 40. 
 214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-12(24) (2015). 
 215. Id. § 115C-47(32a).  
 216. Id. (“The General Assembly urges local boards to adopt policies that prohibit 
superintendents from assigning to any alternative learning program any professional public 
school employee who has received within the last three years a rating on a formal evaluation that 
is less than above standard.”). 
 217. N.C. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 9, at 6. 
 218. See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Alicia B. ex rel. Cynthia B. v. Malloy, No. CV15-5040967, (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2015) (stating that no standards exist for AEPs in Connecticut). 
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schools. In fact, the Connecticut Education Commissioner has gone so far as 
to testify against requiring alternative programs to offer specific subjects and 
minimum hours of instruction taught by qualified teaching staff in the 
Connecticut General Assembly.219 
3. Perpetuation of Race- and Disability-Based Exclusionary Practices 
School districts typically have broad discretion in deciding whether a 
student is sufficiently “at risk” to require assignment to an AEP.220 In addition, 
while districts may have policies governing placement decisions, most do not 
afford students due process protections before making the assignment.221 The 
largely unbounded discretion school districts enjoy in making AEP 
assignments makes room for biased decision-making.222 The students who 
attend AEPs are overwhelmingly students of color (African American in 
particular), from low-income families, and with disabilities.223 North Carolina 
data are illustrative. In 2013–2014, for example, Black students received 46% 
of all AEP placements, even though they made up only were 26% of the total 
student population.”224 In addition, students with disabilities are 
 
 219. Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, Educating Students During an Expulsion: Tutoring, Alternative 
Schools or Nothing?, CONN. MIRROR (Dec. 22, 2015), http://ctmirror.org/2015/12/22/ 
educating-students-during-an-expulsion-tutoring-alternative-schools-or-nothing. 
 220. CARVER ET AL., supra note 8, at 6. 
 221. See, e.g., CHAPEL HILL-CARRBORO CITY SCHS. BOARD POL’YS., https://boardpolicyonline. 
com/bl/?b=chaphill (last visited Dec. 27, 2017) (noting that the school district may institute a 
voluntary referral or involuntary referral; in the latter case, “[a] student may be required to be 
transferred from the regular educational setting to an alternative learning program” for any 
circumstance in which the superintendent determines that a transfer is in the best interest of the 
student or the school system). For further discussion of due process protections, see infra Part IV.E. 
 222. A similar dynamic exists in juvenile justice. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, 
Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization As a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy 
Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1288–89 (2012) (noting initiative to reduce racial 
disparities in and overall rates of juvenile detention through the use of structured decision-
making and describing successes in both aggregate detention and racial disparities); see also NAT’L 
JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SYSTEMS: PROMISING PRACTICES 3 (2014), http://www.njjn.org/our-work/reducing-racial-and-
ethnic-disparities-in-juvenile-justice-systems-promising-practices (describing “[o]bjective, structured 
decision-making tools, such as detention risk assessment instruments, [which, b]y reducing 
individual discretion, . . . can help to mitigate unconscious bias and reduce racial and ethnic 
disparities” (footnote omitted)). 
 223. See Lehr, supra note 5, at 20 (noting state-level research finding that students with 
disabilities were in AEPs in “higher proportions than traditional public schools”); Hassan Tajalli 
& Houmma A. Garba, Discipline or Prejudice? Overrepresentation of Minority Students in Disciplinary 
Alternative Education Programs, 46 URB. REV. 620, 628–30 (2014). 
 224. LANGBERG, supra note 204, at 10, 12 (noting also that students eligible for free and 
reduced lunch were 57% of the statewide student population but made up 91% of the alternative 
learning program population); see also Alexia Fernàndez Campbell, Can a Private Company Teach 
Troubled Kids?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/ 
08/outsourcing-education/497708 (“Nearly all of the students at Richmond Alternative are 
black (97 percent) and most are poor (87 percent qualify for free lunches).”). 
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disproportionately likely to be assigned to AEPs, and to stay in the programs 
for longer durations than their nondisabled counterparts.225 AEPs are also 
disproportionately comprised of economically disadvantaged students.226 
While ostensibly created to fulfill the benign, even commendable goal of 
assisting “at risk” students, the reality of AEPs suggests instead a perpetuation 
of exclusionary practices that case law and legislation developed in the non-
AEP educational context sought to remedy.227 As the next Part demonstrates, 
this body of law—of limited impact for regular public schools —will be even 
less effective in the service of AEP reform.  
IV. ELUDING REFORM 
This Part demonstrates that the new exclusion is resistant to legal reform 
through the typical tools of educational equity. It analyzes the procedural 
protections provided to students facing suspension and shows that students 
who seek to use them to regain admission to school are rarely successful. 
Further, this Part focuses on three key examples of law reform that have 
promoted inclusion (the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) 
and equity (school-finance cases and Title I of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act, designed to compensate for economic disadvantage). It 
considers the ways in which each of these mechanisms could conceivably be 
used to ensure students are not improperly transferred to AEPs and that the 
AEPs are providing an appropriate education. It concludes that these 
mechanisms cannot be relied on to create meaningful AEP reform. This Part 
further explains that the procedural due process protections that must 
precede suspension should—but often do not—precede AEP assignment.  
A. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO SUSPENSION 
Legal challenges to suspensions are generally unsuccessful,228 in large 
part because courts traditionally defer to schools in the imposition of 
discipline.229 The Supreme Court “has repeatedly emphasized the need [to] 
affirm[] the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, 
consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools.”230 Initially, courts held that the in loco parentis 
 
 225. LANGBERG, supra note 204, at 10. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See supra Part III.A. 
 228. Black, supra note 134, at 860–64 (noting study documenting students’ slim chances of 
prevailing on a legal challenge to suspension). 
 229. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“Courts do not and cannot 
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and 
which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values.”); William G. Buss, 
Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 
570 (1971) (noting that historically, schools have been “enshrouded with a mystical immunity 
from judicial interference”). 
 230. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
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doctrine—which gave teachers the authority to act in the stead of parents—
justified any discipline, including corporal punishment, as long as it was 
“reasonable”.231 
While the implementation of compulsory attendance laws rendered the 
in loco parentis doctrine less persuasive as a means to justify discipline, the 
Supreme Court offered a new justification for the imposition of misbehavior-
based suspension in Goss v. Lopez.232 In that case, the first in which the Court 
addressed school suspension,233 the Court held that school discipline 
proceedings are subject to procedural due process protections234 and that 
suspensions for periods between one and ten days require notice and a 
hearing.235 Acknowledging that these protections are comparatively 
minimal,236 the Court reasoned that unlike other forms of state sanctions, 
school discipline serves a pedagogical purpose: “Suspension is considered not 
only to be a necessary tool to maintain order but a valuable educational 
device.”237 Thus, the notion that suspension could function as a pedagogical 
device replaced the in loco parentis doctrine as a justification for deference by 
 
 231. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977). 
 232. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975). 
 233. See id. at 577 (listing cases where the Supreme Court denied cert). Wood v. Strickland was 
the subsequent and only other Supreme Court case to address school discipline. Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 309 (1975). 
 234. Goss, 419 U.S. at 581. In its discussion, the Court stated that “[a] short suspension is, of 
course, a far milder deprivation than expulsion. But, ‘education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments’ and the total exclusion from the educational process for 
more than a trivial period, and certainly if the suspension is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life 
of the suspended child.” Id. at 576 (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
493 (1954)). The Court therefore reasoned that “[a]t the very minimum . . . students facing 
suspension and the consequent interference with a protected property interest must be given some 
kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing.” Id. at 579. 
 235. Id. Many lower courts have applied the Matthews v. Eldridge three-part test when 
determining what procedural process requirements are necessary in cases of long term 
suspensions and expulsions. Amy P. Meek, Note, School Discipline “As Part of the Teaching Process”: 
Alternative and Compensatory Education Required by the State’s Interest in Keeping Children in School, 28 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 165–66 (2009). 
 236. Goss, 419 U.S. at 583 (“[W]e have imposed requirements which are, if anything, less than 
a fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions.”). 
Scholars have argued that the implementation of zero tolerance—and the routine presence of 
police officers in schools—justify rethinking the notion that school discipline serves only pedagogical 
goals. See, e.g., Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 863 (2012). 
 237. Goss, 419 U.S. at 580; see also id. at 596 n.15 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The Court itself 
recognizes that the requirements it imposes are, ‘if anything, less than a fair-minded school 
principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions.’”). The Supreme 
Court yet again assumed benevolence and good faith on the part of school administrators when 
the Court rejected the notion that a school must provide due process prior to imposing corporal 
punishment, because “traditional common-law remedies are fully adequate to afford due 
process.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672, 677 (1977) (holding that severe paddling that 
resulted in a hematoma requiring medical attention was “an aberration”). 
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courts to schools.238 In its subsequent case on misbehavior-based school 
exclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed this deferential approach.239  
Like the Court in Goss, lower courts focus almost exclusively on 
procedural due process in school discipline cases, often at the expense of 
substantive due process. This emphasis is fully evident in the Fourth Circuit 
case Ratner v. Loudoun County Public Schools.240 The student in that case was 
suspended for being in possession of a knife, which the Court found he had 
taken from a classmate who had brought it to school in a moment of suicidal 
despair.241 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit rejected the student’s challenge to 
the suspension, finding that he had received the required procedural due 
process protections and that he was entitled to nothing more.242 Lower courts 
have found, like the Ratner Court, “that so long as a student receives some 
rudimentary procedural due process they will not ‘second-guess’ the 
substance of school rules or their application.”243 Procedural due process 
protections have not acted as much of a check on misbehavior-based 
exclusion; since the 1970s, many students’ rates of suspension have doubled 
and tripled.244  
One Massachusetts case involving a legal challenge to a suspension 
demonstrates how courts conceptualize the trope of the undeserving child in 
the context of student misbehavior. In 1995, the Supreme Judicial Court let 
stand a suspension of a student for possession—not use—of a lipstick case 
knife on school property.245 The student had previously demonstrated 
emotional problems and had engaged in self-injurious behavior in the past, 
including slashing her wrists.246 The lipstick knife had been given to her by 
her mother’s boyfriend, and the student believed the knife was a “joke.”247 
The Court noted with approval the reasoning of the superintendent who 
imposed the suspension: “In making his decision, [the superintendent] 
considered the lipstick knife itself, the opinion of the plaintiff’s social worker 
 
 238. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 580; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 
(1995) (“In T. L. O. we rejected the notion that public schools, like private schools, exercise only 
parental power over their students, which of course is not subject to constitutional constraints. 
Such a view of things, we said, ‘is not entirely “consonant with compulsory education laws,”’ . . . .” 
(citations omitted) (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 662)). 
 239. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal courts 
to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in 
wisdom or compassion.”). 
 240. Ratner v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 16 F. App’x 140, 142 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).  
 241. Id. at 141–42. 
 242. Id. at 142. 
 243. Black, supra note 134, at 826, 865–67 (describing and criticizing the trend of courts 
passing on substantive due process claims and focusing only on whether students received 
procedural due process protections). 
 244. LOSEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 6. 
 245. Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1088 (Mass. 1995). 
 246. Id. at 1091. 
 247. Id. 
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that the plaintiff was unstable, the plaintiff’s disciplinary record, and her 
troubled family as factors favoring expulsion.”248  
Here, the court did not consider the extenuating circumstances, except 
insofar as they suggested that she had a troubled history.249 Her difficult home 
life might have cautioned against suspension. A school true to the early vision 
of education as a means of promoting upward mobility250 would want to keep 
a child from a difficult family situation enrolled; classes, extracurriculars, and 
caring teachers could  offer the stability and structure that such a family might 
struggle to provide. Instead, her troubled family life was a strike against her,251 
functioning as an aggravating, rather than a mitigating factor in a 
counterintuitive way. One can see the trope of the undeserving child 
operating in the background of this decision to take action of excluding the 
child from school. In relying not only on her misbehavior, but also her 
problematic family and home life, as justification to keep her out of school, 
the administration defaults to stereotypes about students based on family 
profile.  
B. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: HOPE BUT  
MINIMAL HELP 
The guiding principle of the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act252 is that students with disabilities are entitled to free, appropriate 
education in the least restrictive environment appropriate to meet their 
needs.253 Despite the protections afforded by the IDEA, the law facilitates 
disproportionate representation of students with disabilities in AEPs. In Honig 
v. Doe, the Supreme Court interpreted IDEA’s predecessor statute to mean 
that students with disabilities who misbehave in ways consistent with their 
diagnosis may not be suspended from an educational setting for more than 
ten days.254 However, administrators can unilaterally remove students with 
disabilities from their public school and place them in an “interim alternative 
 
 248. Id. at 1092.  
 249. Id. 
 250. See supra Part II.A. 
 251. Superintendent, 653 N.E.2d at 1094, 1096 (justifying her exclusion by invoking the 
“broad disciplinary authority historically conferred on school officials” and affirming “the 
authority of the Legislature and school officials to exclude students who misbehave”). 
 252. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012)). The Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975 was later renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 
 253. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5). The statute’s operational mechanism is the individualized 
education program (“IEP”), a written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, 
reviewed, and revised by a team of teachers and administrators. 
 254. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323–24 (1988) (holding that the “stay-put” provision of 
the Education of the Handicapped Act prohibited local school district from unilaterally 
excluding disabled children from the classroom for dangerous or disruptive conduct stemming 
from their disabilities during the pendency of the review proceedings). 
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educational setting” for up to 45 days, without parental consent, if the 
behavior leading to the suspension recommendation involved weapons, 
drugs, or serious bodily injury.255 This placement can occur even if the 
behavior was directly related to the disability.256 In addition, absent 
misbehavior serious enough to warrant suspension, the school can initiate 
proceedings to change a disabled student’s placement into an AEP.257 In such 
an event, the student’s ability to challenge this recommendation is severely 
constrained by labyrinthine IDEA procedures.258  
In addition, AEPs sometimes impose requirements that 
disproportionately burden students with disabilities. In many cases, students 
in AEPs may not return to their base schools unless they first demonstrate 
conformity with some specified set of behavioral criteria established by the 
AEPs.259 Students with emotional or behavioral disabilities, who by definition 
 
 255. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(G). 
 256. Id.; see also Lehr, supra note 5, at 29 (reporting that 40% of surveyed states indicate that 
their AEPs are used as interim alternative educational settings for students with disabilities); 
Russell J. Skiba, Special Education and School Discipline: A Precarious Balance, 27 BEHAVIORAL 
DISORDERS 81, 83 (2002) (discussing tension between preservation of school safety and 
protection of rights of students with disabilities).  
 257. Michele Scavongelli & Marlies Spanjaard, Succeeding in Manifestation Determination 
Reviews: A Step-by-Step Approach for Obtaining the Best Result for Your Client, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 
278, 289 (2015) (“A school may be utilizing the disciplinary process in an effort to remove a 
difficult student that the school is unable or unwilling to adequately serve.”). A U.S. Department 
of Justice investigation into Georgia’s alternative education program found that rather than 
provide students with disabilities in general education settings the necessary therapeutic and 
educational supports to enable them to succeed in those settings, schools sent these students to 
AEPs. The investigation further uncovered that students with disabilities were sent to these AEPs 
after sporadic and minor episodes of misbehavior and in lieu of less restrictive and drastic 
options, as the law requires. Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., to Ga. Governor Nathan Deal and Ga. Att’y Gen. 
Sam Olens (July 15, 2015), https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/gnets_lof.pdf. Similarly, 
a report by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education found that 
the state’s Springfield Public School system inappropriately removed students with disabilities 
from general education environments and did not appropriately train its general education staff 
on special education topics. S.S. v. City of Springfield, 146 F. Supp. 3d 414, 419 (D. Mass. 2015).  
 258. See Pasachoff, supra note 108, at 1419 (acknowledging that constraints are more 
prevalent on low-income children compared to wealthy children). 
 259. CARVER ET AL., supra note 8, at 4; see, e.g., Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, & Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act at 
14–15, 26, ex rel. W.P. v. Jefferson Par. Pub. Sch. Sys. (Dep’t of Educ. May 17, 2012), https://www. 
splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/case/complaint_0.pdf [hereinafter 
Title VI Complaint] (In one Louisiana AEP, there exist “three levels of behavior management, 
and a student cannot move from one level to the next unless they receive a certain number of 
points by performing specific compliance behaviors for a particular number of consecutive days. 
If a student achieves some progress in earning points based on good behavior and then has a 
behavior incident at school, he or she may be bumped down to a previous level and required to 
start again. In order to exit this tri-level program, a student must achieve 65% compliance with 
Level 1 for 15 consecutive days, 75% compliance with Level 2 for 15 consecutive days, and 85% 
compliance with Level 3 for 15 consecutive days, a daunting task for any student and particularly 
students with emotional or behavioral disabilities” (footnotes omitted)). 
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have difficulty demonstrating appropriate behavior even under normal 
circumstances, must comply with these criteria in order to “earn their way” 
back to their base school.260 As a result, students with disabilities often stay in 
AEPs for longer periods than their non-disabled counterparts.261 
C. SCHOOL-FINANCE PRECEDENT: A STRAINED FIT 
As the Supreme Court began to erect ever more barriers to meaningful 
school integration after the initial wave of desegregation consent decrees,262 
the need for methods other than desegregation injunctions to ameliorate the 
harms of racially isolated high-poverty schools became apparent. Advocates in 
the early 1970s thus began to challenge school-finance systems that result in 
funding disparities for school districts.263  
Litigation challenging school-finance systems proceeded in three 
“waves.”264 The first wave, relying on the Equal Protection Clause, was short-
lived and ended when the U.S. Supreme Court held in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez that education is not a fundamental right and that 
inequitable school-financing schemes trigger only rational-basis review.265 In 
 
 260. Title VI Complaint, supra note 259, at 26.  
 261. Id. at 2 (In the Jefferson Parish Public School System, “[t]he average length of stay . . . 
for African American high school students is 115.3 days as compared to an average length of stay 
of 74.4 days for white high school students. The average length of stay . . . for students with 
disabilities is 223.9 days as compared to an average length of stay of 94.5 days for students without 
disabilities.” (footnote omitted)). 
 262. See John Charles Boger, Education’s “Perfect Storm”? Racial Resegregation, High Stakes 
Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1375, 1379 & n.6 
(2003) (discussing Supreme Court cases that have signaled federal disengagement from court-
ordered desegregation).  
 263. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 253 n.11 (1999) (noting that 
Derrick Bell, who had worked on “school desegregation cases with the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund from 1960 to 1966” also “work[ed] on one of the earliest school finance cases”). The story 
of school finance cases has been well told. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL STAFF, EQUITY 
AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 
1999); SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY (Martin R. West 
& Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007); Heise, supra note 170; William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When 
“Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY 
L.J. 545 (2006); James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on School Finance 
Litigation: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 463 (2004); William E. 
Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision 
As a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1994); William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, 
Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 
219 (1990). 
 264. Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”: From 
Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1995). 
 265. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29, 35, 40 (1973). Despite 
this holding, there remains a substantial scholarly interest in arguing that a fundamental right to 
education exists under the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 123 (2004) (concluding that federal 
courts have been “tragically wrong” in failing to find a constitutional right to education); 
Friedman & Solow, supra note 32, at 149 (“Interpreting the Constitution as judges do, especially 
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the second wave, lasting roughly from 1973 to 1989, plaintiffs argued that 
state equal protection clauses, combined with the education clauses in state 
constitutions, require states to equalize per-pupil spending.266 These so-called 
“equity claims” had modest success, with plaintiffs prevailing in seven of 
twenty-two cases filed.267  
In the third wave,268 plaintiffs largely abandoned equity claims in favor of 
arguments based on the education clause included in every state 
constitution.269 The majority of state courts reaching the merits of these 
claims270 determined that state educational clauses require states to deliver 
 
in Due Process cases, there is a federal constitutional right to a minimally adequate education.”); 
Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 334 (2006) (arguing 
that the federal government has a constitutional duty to ensure that every child has the 
opportunity to receive an education). 
 266. William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination of the 
Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1189 
(2003); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referencing 
“recent state . . . court decisions concerning the unconstitutionality of state educational financing 
schemes”). “[N]othing in the Court’s decision today should inhibit further review of state 
educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions.” Id. at 133 n.100. 
 267. Rebell, supra note 102, at 1500–05 (discussing the results in state cases and the 
substantive meaning of the constitutional right to education in those cases). Commentators argue 
that the results in these early cases demonstrated judicial unwillingness to interfere with school 
finance policy, because of some of the same separation of powers concerns cited by the Rodriguez 
court. See, e.g., Koski, supra note 266, at 1189.  
 268. But see James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
1223, 1229–30 (2008) (arguing that the cases should not be seen as falling into distinct waves 
and that most cases involve claims of comparability).  
 269. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; 
ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST. 
art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1; IOWA CONST. 
art. IX, 2d, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. 
art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 8, § 201; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); 
MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, 
art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. 
CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, 
§ 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. 
XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH 
CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; W. 
VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1. Michael Rebell argues 
that courts ruling for plaintiffs in these cases have “revived and given major significance to the 
long-dormant provisions that were originally incorporated into state constitutions as part of the 
common school movement of the mid-nineteenth century.” Michael A. Rebell, The Right to 
Comprehensive Educational Opportunity, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 81 (2012). 
 270. States that have held school finance challenges nonjusticiable are Florida, Illinois, 
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. See Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. 
Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 405 (Fla. 1996); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 
N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 
164, 169 (Neb. 2007); Okla. Educ. Ass’n. v. State ex rel. Okla. Legislature, 158 P.3d 1058, 1065–66 
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some basic substantive level of education.”271 For instance, in Rose v. Council 
for Better Education, the Kentucky Supreme Court became the first to articulate 
a qualitative right to education, holding that a constitutionally adequate 
education included several specific skills and outcomes in each major subject 
of the school curriculum.272 Numerous other state courts borrowed from 
Rose’s standards in defining their own.273 These so-called adequacy claims have 
met with more success than equity claims.274  
James Ryan posits that race has played an important role in determining 
the outcome of school-finance cases.275 He writes: 
Based on my review of the pertinent data, it appears that minority 
school districts—particularly urban minority districts—do not fare 
as well as white districts in school finance litigation. More precisely, 
minority districts do not win school finance cases nearly as often as 
white districts do, and in the few states where minority districts have 
successfully challenged school finance schemes, they have 
encountered legislative recalcitrance that exceeds, in both intensity 
and duration, the legislative resistance that successful white districts 
have faced. As this and additional evidence suggests, there are strong 
reasons to believe that the racial composition of the school district 
plays an influential role in determining its success or failure in 
school finance litigation and legislative reform.276 
 
(Okla. 2007); Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. 1999); Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. 
Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 787 (R.I. 2014); Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58–59 (R.I. 1995). 
 271. Conn. Coal. for Justice v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 249–50 n.55 (Conn. 2010) (cataloguing 
cases). The states that have reached the merits and determined that no substantive level of 
education is required include Indiana, Louisiana, and Maine. See Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 
516, 522 (Ind. 2009) (“[T]he [e]ducation [c]lause of the Indiana [c]onstitution does not impose 
upon government an affirmative duty to achieve any particular standard of resulting educational 
quality.”); Charlet v. Legislature of La., 97-0212, (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98); 713 So. 2d 1199, 1207; 
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 857 (Me. 1995). 
 272. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212–13 (Ky. 1989). 
 273. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 165–66 (Ala. 1993); Lake View Sch. 
Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 485–87 (Ark. 2002); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. 
Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 734–35 (Idaho 1993); McDuffy v. Sec’y for Exec. Office of 
Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 
1359–60 (N.H. 1997); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997); Abbeville Cty. Sch. 
Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999). 
 274. See Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, The Adequacy Lawsuit: A Critical Appraisal, in 
SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 1, 2 (Martin R. West  
& Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (“Adequacy plaintiffs have won victories in twenty-five states, 
including ten of the fourteen cases decided between 2003 and 2005.”).  
 275. See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432, 434 
(1999). 
 276. Id. at 433–34 (footnote omitted). 
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If one accepts Professor Ryan’s analysis,277 one can see a manifestation of 
the trope of the undeserving child. Professor Ryan suggests that courts’ 
implicit understanding of students as falling into more or less “deserving” and 
“undeserving” categories—which map on to past exclusionary practices—is 
reflected in the outcomes of facially colorblind adequacy claims.278 Other 
commentators, too, argue that adequacy claims have succeeded where equity 
claims have failed precisely because they avoid specifically referencing the 
historically undeserving and instead emphasize the universality of the need 
for adequate education.279 
These cases inform AEP reform in their development of the state-
constitution-based right to education. Courts that have reached the merits of 
adequacy claims have held that the education clauses in state constitutions 
create educational rights in students.280 However, courts have afforded 
different levels of weight to that right.281 16 states have declared education to 
be a fundamental right;282 seven states have held the contrary.283 The scope 
and content of the right in the remaining 37 states is unclear. 
 
 277. Id. at 435 (“This Article thus represents a first look at the evidence and an invitation to 
those with the appropriate analytical skills to take a closer inspection of the data.”). 
 278. A subsequent empirical analysis, conducted in response to Ryan’s argument and 
hypothesis, yielded preliminary findings suggesting that his hypothesis is correct. See generally 
Yohance C. Edwards & Jennifer Ahern, Unequal Treatment in State Supreme Courts: Minority and City 
Schools in Education Finance Reform Litigation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 326 (2004). 
 279. Richard Briffault, Adding Adequacy to Equity, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL 
PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 25, 38–41 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) 
(“In the aftermath of the publication of A Nation at Risk in the early 1980s, excellence (or its lack) 
replaced equity as the public’s ‘top concern’ about education.”); Heise, supra note 264, at  
1174–75 (stating that adequacy “exhibits greater appeal to widely accepted norms of fairness and 
opportunity” and “cohere[s] with the emerging educational standards movement”). 
 280. Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy 
Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 89–95 (2010) 
(surveying the outcomes in school finance litigation). 
 281. Robyn K. Bitner, Note, Exiled from Education: Plyer v. Doe’s Impact on the Constitutionality 
of Long-Term Suspensions and Expulsions, 101 VA. L. REV. 763, 780–81 (2015). 
 282. Id. at 766 n.15 (listing Arizona, California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, 
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). See Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 
(Ariz. 1973); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 
359, 374 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989); 
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993); Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 
So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1985); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1358–59 (N.H. 
1997); Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713, 720 (N.J. 1975); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249,  
255–56 (N.C. 1997); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994); Sch. 
Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass’n, 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995); Brigham v. State, 692 
A.2d 384, 391–95 (Vt. 1997); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994); Cathe A. v. 
Doddridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340, 346 (W. Va. 1997); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 
568, 579 (Wis. 1989); Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980). 
 283. Bitner, supra note 281 at 779 n.97 (listing Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island); see Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018–19 
(Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 
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The fact that so few courts explicitly recognize a fundamental right to 
education presents two separate but related problems in the AEP context. The 
first is that without recognition of education as a fundamental constitutional 
right, courts have been reluctant to hold that the right to education includes 
a right to alternative education. In multiple states that do not consider 
education to be a fundamental right, students who are suspended or expelled 
are not provided alternative education in any setting.284 In several of these 
states, students have challenged the denial, arguing that the right to 
education is not forfeited upon misbehavior.285 These students seek access to 
AEPs, for the understandable reason that they and their parents view some 
education—albeit in a demonstrably inferior AEP—as better than no 
education at all.286 However, courts have been unsympathetic to these claims. 
For example, in Massachusetts and Nebraska—two states in which education 
is not considered a fundamental right—the state supreme courts have held 
that the right to education is conditioned on a student’s good behavior in 
school.287 Since claims filed in states where education has less than 
fundamental-right status receive a lower standard of review, states easily can 
show that the denial of education is rationally related to the base school’s goal 
of maintaining order.288  
Even in states that do recognize a fundamental right to education, courts 
have found that a student’s misbehavior can cause her to forfeit that right. In 
King ex rel Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort County Board of Education, the plaintiff 
argued that because the right to education had been earlier found to be 
fundamental under the North Carolina constitution, she was entitled to 
attend an alternative school rather than be totally excluded from all 
educational settings.289 The North Carolina court reasoned, as had the 
Massachusetts and Nebraska courts, that the right to education is contingent 
 
537 P.2d 635, 647 (Idaho 1975); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1194 (Ill. 
1996); Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ind. 2009); Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of 
Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095–97 (Mass. 1995); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 
55 (R.I. 1995); see also Black, supra note 13, at 13 (noting that even courts that do not declare 
education to be a fundamental right still “obligate the state to deliver certain educational 
opportunities” but grant the legislature broad discretion in doing so). 
 284. Bitner, supra note 281, at 767. 
 285. See Meek, supra note 235, at 180–83 (discussing some of these cases). 
 286. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text. 
 287. Superintendent, 653 N.E.2d at 1096–97 (providing no alternative education to ninth 
grade student who brought a knife to school); Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 558 N.W.2d 
807, 813 (Neb. 1997). 
 288. Superintendent, 653 N.E.2d at 1097 (holding that since an expulsion was rationally 
related to the maintenance of order in the school, the defendants’ decision not to provide the 
plaintiff with an alternate education does not render her expulsion unconstitutional); Kolesnick, 
558 N.W.2d at 813; see also Meek, supra note 235, at 180 (discussing the challenges related to 
alternative education). 
 289. King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ. 704 S.E.2d 259, 261–63 (N.C. 2010). 
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on a student’s compliance with school rules and may be forfeited.290 
Notwithstanding fundamental-right status, the Court in King declined to apply 
strict scrutiny to the decision to deny the plaintiff alternative education.291 It 
did so on the grounds that strict scrutiny would impose an unworkable burden 
on school administrators, citing the history of affording deference to 
schools.292  
The King Court’s analysis understates the significance of affording 
education fundamental-right status. While deference to schools may apply in 
routine matters of school administration, the outright denial of all education 
services surely requires strict scrutiny, as argued in the dissenting opinion.293 
As one commentator notes, “[t]he North Carolina Constitution does not limit 
th[e] right to [education to] children who thrive in a traditional learning 
environment.”294 While the analysis of the majority opinion seems doctrinally 
incoherent, it is perfectly consistent with the notion that education can be 
reserved for blameless children, as suggested in Plyler.295  
In any event, without a constitutional right to alternative education, 
courts are unlikely to find for a hypothetical plaintiff in an AEP who argues 
that the substandard offerings in AEPs do not comport with constitutional 
requirements.296 In a challenge to AEPs serving suspended students in 
Tennessee,297 the plaintiffs argued that certain components of the AEP 
violated the equal protection and education clauses of the Tennessee 
 
 290. Id. at 265. Commentators have critiqued the application of forfeiture theory to 
education. Robyn Bitner for example, argues that the traditional justifications for criminal and 
civil forfeiture are inapposite to youth. Criminal forfeiture is justified on the basis that the 
convicted criminal received constitutional protections, including proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Bitner further argues that the Supreme Court’s recognition that children’s characters are 
in formation, that they are susceptible to peer pressure, and that they are impulsive, should 
caution against the application of civil forfeiture theory, which is based on social contract theory. 
Bitner, supra note 281, at 799–801. 
 291. King, 704 S.E.2d at 267–68 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). Strict scrutiny is ordinarily the applicable level of review in assessing the denial of a 
fundamental constitutional right. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 16 (1973) (reaffirming that equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative 
classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right). 
 292. King, 704 S.E.2d at 262 (majority opinion) (“[S]chool districts are in the best position 
to judge the student’s actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances and tailor the 
appropriate punishment to fit the unique circumstances of each student’s situation.” (quoting 
RM v. Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 102 P.3d 868, 876 (Wyo. 2004))).  
 293. Id. at 267 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 294. Mary Kenyon Sullivan, Long-Term Suspensions and the Right to an Education: An Alternative 
Approach, 90 N.C. L. REV. 293, 302 (2011). 
 295. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982);  see also supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text. 
 296. Dean Hill Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform: Litigating School Exclusion, 75 TENN. L. 
REV. 265, 284 (2008) (predicting that challenges to adequacy of education in AEPs will fail). 
 297. C.S.C. v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. E2006-00087-COA-R3CV, 2006 WL 3731304, at 
*1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 
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Constitution.298 The plaintiffs objected to their placement in a nighttime 
program that was computer-based, while other suspended students were 
placed in a daytime program with traditional instruction.299 They further 
objected to the fact that the school district did not provide public 
transportation to the night program.300  
In ruling for the state, the court noted that while the Tennessee Supreme 
Court had recognized that its constitution guarantees a right to an education, 
“[w]e are not aware . . . of any authority creating a right to alternative 
education in and for a suspended or expelled student.”301 The court further 
concluded that there was a rational basis for denying transportation,302 noting 
that the state’s AEPs were never intended to be the same as other public 
schools:  
The legislature has determined that students who do not follow the 
rules at their regular schools may be suspended or expelled from 
those schools . . . [and that] suspended . . . students may receive 
instruction at an alternative school. These alternative schools are 
different from regular public schools. Alternative education students 
have broken the rules of their respective schools; therefore, they are 
subject to losing certain services (e.g., transportation) and 
opportunities (e.g., extracurricular activities). They are not entitled 
to receive the same instruction and services that are provided to 
students who have continued to follow the rules.303  
In sum, the school-finance precedent fleshing out a state Constitution-
based right to education offers little hope of relief for students who wish to 
challenge their assignment to an AEP. 
D. THE “EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS” ACT: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR 
REFORM 
A final example of legislators’ relatively minimal consideration for AEP 
students is found within the 2015 Every Student Succeeds Act (“ESSA”)304 and 
its predecessor, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (“ESEA”).305 
Through the ESEA, the Johnson Administration sought to improve 
educational opportunity for low-income students by providing states with 
 
 298. Id. at *12–13. 
 299. Id. at *7. 
 300. Id. at *13. 
 301. Id. at *10.  
 302. Id. at *14. 
 303. Id. (citations omitted). 
 304. See Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114–95, § 1005, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015) (to 
be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311(d)(1)(B)(i)) (providing for the implementation of state 
accountability systems for underperforming schools). 
 305. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 
(amended and reauthorized as NCLB in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. in 2002). 
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supplemental funding.306 Title I of the statute authorized the provision of 
federal funds to all school districts in which at least ten children and 2% of 
the overall student population are classified as poor.307 This low threshold 
enables nearly all school districts to receive some federal funding.308  
Amid a growing concern over the perceived mediocrity of American 
schools,309 Congress imposed new requirements on states when it 
reauthorized ESEA in 1994 as the Improving America’s Schools Act 
(“IASA”).310 IASA highlighted the importance of ensuring that students 
“acquire the knowledge and skills contained in challenging State content 
standards.”311 Specifically, IASA required all school districts both to identify 
schools that were not making what it deemed “Adequate Yearly Progress” 
(“AYP”) toward the goal of proficiency for all students and to demonstrate the 
formal steps that those schools were taking to improve.312 
The No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”), the 2001 revision, intensified 
the standards-based orientation of the IASA. For the first time, Congress tied 
provisions of Title I funds to states’ adoption of teaching, testing, and 
accountability programs.313 NCLB required teachers to be “highly qualified,” 
defined by demonstrated competence in the subjects they taught.314 
Additionally, it required states to administer annual tests to students in math, 
reading, and science.315 While commentators have praised NCLB’s 
accountability standards for the light they shone on low-performing schools 
 
 306. Derek Black, Education’s Elusive Future, Storied Past, and the Fundamental Inequities Between, 
46 GA. L. REV. 557, 605 (2012). 
 307. Improving Basic Programs Operated by Local Educational Agencies (Title I, Part A), U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/legislation.html (last modified Sept. 29, 2016). 
 308. See Grant Distribution Formulas, NEW AMERICA, http://febp.newamerica.net/background-
analysis/no-child-left-behind-act-title-i-distribution-formulas (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
 309. The 1983 report “A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform” described 
American children far behind their peers in other countries, minority children in the United States far 
behind their white peers, and an overall increase in illiteracy. DAVID P. GARDNER ET AL., A NATION AT 
RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 8–9 (1983), https://permanent.access.gpo. 
gov/lps3244/ED226006.pdf. Among several solutions, the report recommended performance 
standards and assessments for all students and teachers. Id. at 28. 
 310. Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality in Education Through the No Child 
Left Behind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 657 (2011). 
 311. Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 1001(d), 108 Stat. 3518. 
 312. Id. 
 313. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(J) (2012) (describing the process by which states develop 
accountability and curriculum plans that must be approved by the Department of Education in 
return for Title I funds). 
 314. Id. §§ 6314(b)(1)(C), 6315(c)(1)(E). 
 315. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B)(v)(I)–(II). In 2011, President Obama through executive action 
created a waiver program permitting states flexibility from NCLB’s mandates in exchange for 
creating their own plans to set high standards, improve accountability, and support the evaluation 
and development of teachers and principals. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EVERY STUDENT 
SUCCEEDS ACT: A PROGRESS REPORT ON ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 8 (2015), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/ESSA%2BProgress%2BReport.pdf. 
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and students,316 the implementation of these standards generated ample 
criticism for disproportionately emphasizing testing and unfairly stigmatizing 
low-performing schools.317 
Accountability standards also create incentives for regular public schools 
to transfer academically struggling students to AEPs rather than address their 
learning difficulties in the first instance.318 Critics note that these standards 
encourage public schools to use AEPs as a “silent release valve” when 
“straining under the pressure of accountability reform.”319 Yet, as will be 
shown, these same standards then fail to function effectively to promote the 
success of students once they are sent to AEPs. 
The ESSA,320 the 2015 revision of the ESEA, aims to maintain a focus on 
accountability while turning over the task of how to measure accountability to 
states.321 While the purpose of the law is to promote and provide tools for 
measuring accountability of regular schools, it will be of limited utility in 
improving AEPs. For example, ESSA requires states to administer annual or 
semi-annual tests to students in math, reading, and science.322 Each state must 
then implement a system that “meaningfully differentiat[es]” between 
schools’ academic performances.323 These academic performances are 
determined in large part by aggregate test results for every grade and for 
several specific demographic groups, including minorities, English language 
learners, migrant students, and economically disadvantaged students.324 
Overall and disaggregated test results, along with other metrics such as 
attendance and graduation rates, are used to assess whether a school is in 
need of “comprehensive support and improvement” from the state.325 Schools 
that fall into this category are required to implement locally designed 
 
 316. Boger, supra note 262, at 1440 (summarizing favorable commentary). 
 317. Id. at 1450 (discussing how NCLB encourages parental flight from schools deemed low-
performing, demoralizes teachers, and creates incentives for schools to exclude students deemed 
low-performing); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 932, 932–33 (2004) (describing NCLB as “at war with itself” because while its goals are 
laudable, it creates incentives that undercut those goals). 
 318. Vogell & Fresques, supra note 2 (describing practice of school district in Orlando, 
Florida, of transferring struggling students to AEPs as a means of bolstering the graduation rates 
of the regular public school in order to comply with accountability standards). 
 319. Id. In the related context of criminal justice, Professor Erin Collins argues that so-called 
problem-solving courts, which ostensibly replace typical criminal court processing with a system 
that focuses on the problems that led individuals to the system, function in a similar way—as 
“permanent, institutionalized release valves [which] help the broken system continue to operate 
in perpetuity despite its flaws.” Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEO. L.J. 1481, 1508 (2017). 
 320. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114–95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015) (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(b) (West 2017)). 
 321. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(b). 
 322. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B)(v)(I)–(II). 
 323. Id. § 6311(c)(4)(C). 
 324. Id. § 6311(c)(2). 
 325. Id. § 6311(c)(4)(D)(i). 
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improvement plans and are monitored by the state educational agency.326 If a 
school’s performance does not improve after several years on the 
improvement plan, ESSA permits states to take more drastic action, including 
direct action at the school level.327 The Act further requires states to make 
public the performance of such schools and offer remedial measures to 
students enrolled in them.328 These remedial measures include the 
opportunity for an inter-district transfer to a better-performing public school, 
including charter schools.329  
Provisions of the ESSA make it more difficult for policymakers to hold 
AEPs accountable for student academic progress. First, the law permits states 
to exclude, for accountability purposes, the test scores of students who attend 
a school for less than a full school year.330 Since  AEPs are often designed as 
temporary placements,331 the full-year provision can result in excluding the 
test scores of students attending such schools. Alternatively, the test scores of 
AEP students may be attributed to the base schools rather than to the AEPs.332 
Second, ESSA holds schools accountable for graduation rates,333 yet AEPs may 
send students back to their base school prior to graduation334 or fail to track 
what happens to them after they leave the AEP.335 Third, the provision for 
identification and improvement of low-performing schools appears not to 
apply to AEPs because of qualifying language.336 Specifically, this language 
 
 326. Id. § 6311(d)(2). 
 327. Id. § 6311(d)(3)(A)(i)(I). 
 328. Id. § 6311(h); see, e.g., Education First N.C. School Report Cards, N.C. PUB. SCHS., 
http://www.ncreportcards.org/src/main.jsp (last visited Dec. 27, 2017) (displaying North 
Carolina public school report cards); K-12 Public Schools Report Card, GA. GOVERNOR’S OFF. 
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT, https://gaawards.gosa.ga.gov/analytics/saw.dll?dashboard (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2017) (displaying Georgia public school report cards); School Report Cards, TEX. EDUC. 
AGENCY, https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport//src (last visited Dec. 27, 2017) (displaying 
Texas public school report cards). 
 329. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6303b (West 2017). 
 330. Id. § 6311(c)(4)(F)(I). 
 331. See Vogell & Fresques, supra note 2. 
 332. ACLU, supra note 17, at 19. 
 333. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 1111, 129 Stat. 1820, 1835 (2015) 
(to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(4)(A)(i)(I)(bb)). 
 334. CARVER ET AL., supra note 8, at 16. 
 335. MARY MAGEE QUINN ET AL., AMERICAN INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, STUDY OF EFFECTIVE 
ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS: FINAL GRANT REPORT 3 (2007), http://files.eric.ed.gov/ 
fulltext/ED522072.pdf (“Little is know [sic] about whom alternative programs serve and why, 
how they function, the degree to which they are responsive to all children’s education needs, and 
the extent to which children enrolled in these schools benefit from positive experiences and 
outcomes.”); Vogell & Fresques, supra note 2.  
 336. Every Student Succeeds Act § 1111, 129 Stat. at 1838 (requiring states to establish a 
system to identify the lowest performing 5% of schools and all public high schools failing to 
graduate one third or more of their students). For each school identified by the state, the LEA 
must develop and implement a school level targeted support and improvement plan to improve 
student outcomes. Id. ESSA also authorizes states to take additional action in LEAs with “a 
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indicates that states have more discretion when dealing with schools that serve 
mostly students who are returning to education or are off track to graduate, 
and districts can choose not to implement improvement plans for schools with 
fewer than 100 students.337 AEPs are typically much smaller than regular 
schools, and in many cases they specifically serve students returning to 
education or students who are off-track academically.338 This exemption 
further permits AEPs to slip beneath the radar of accountability that ESSA 
purports to provide.339  
Many AEPs flouted the provisions of NCLB that applied to them, and 
they appear to have done so with impunity. In several states, districts failed to 
publish required data on test scores and graduation rates. In North Carolina, 
the grades required by ESSA are not publicly available for AEPs.340 In New 
York, AEPs are not required to publish report cards.341 In Mississippi, the state 
makes “essential facts about each of [the state’s public] schools: population, 
demographics, and test scores” available to members of the public through 
an easily accessible database.342 Yet the state’s AEPs do not appear on the 
database in any form.343 A dearth of easily accessible data in Georgia led an 
 
significant number of schools that are consistently identified by the State” using the previous 
criteria. Id.  
 337. Id.; see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SUMMARY OF THE EVERY STUDENT 
SUCCEEDS ACT, LEGISLATION REAUTHORIZING THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 5 
(2016), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/capitolforum/2015/onlineresources/summary_12_10.pdf. 
 338. CARVER ET AL., supra note 8, at 6. 
 339. That districts regularly flout without consequence the federal publication requirement 
with respect to AEPs suggests several possibilities. One is that districts understand that AEPs are 
poorly regarded by parents and that publication of data confirming parents’ perception serves 
no practical purpose. Another possibility is that the underlying intent of the NCLB publication 
requirement—to enable parents to “shop around” to avoid poorly-performing schools—is 
irrelevant in a context where parents and students are without choice. Susan DeJarnatt argues 
that the school-choice movement in any event offers “hollow hope” for low-income parents in 
racially isolated neighborhoods. Susan L. DeJarnatt, School Choice and the (Ir)rational Parent, 15 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 41–42 (2008) (“Many proponents of school choice explicitly 
argue for choice as a means of equalizing opportunity and giving poor kids the choices now only 
available to those with the funds to attend private school or buy houses in high-performing school 
districts. But this equality is an illusion if schools and parents are still motivated by a desire to 
exclude the poor. NCLB offers a hollow hope to parents in failing multi-school districts because 
it does not enable those parents to escape the district itself. . . . Vouchers offer a similar hollow 
hope: no politically viable voucher proposal will offer voucher amounts sufficient to pay tuition 
at an elite private school, and none is likely to require those schools to admit struggling poor 
students.” (citations omitted)). 
 340. See N.C. SCH. REP. CARDS, https://ncreportcards.ondemand.sas.com/SASVisualAnalytics 
Viewer/VisualAnalyticsViewer_guest.jsp?reportPath=/ReportCard/NC_SRC&reportName=NC+
Report+Cards (last visited Dec. 27, 2017) (highlighting there is no publically available 
information on AEPs).  
 341. Elisa Hyman, School Push-outs: An Urban Case Study, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 684, 685 
(2005). 
 342. ACLU, supra note 17, at 18–19. 
 343. Id. 
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audit to conclude that the state’s AEPs are improperly unaccountable for 
student performance and to question their cost effectiveness. In 1000-plus 
pages of text of the ESSA, there is no substantive discussion of alternative 
education.344 This omission may encourage states to continue their practices 
of failing to report statutorily required information about AEPs. 
In addition to the issues identified with the ESSA, a loophole in a 
different federal regulation exists that compounds the ways in which AEPs 
elude accountability. Federal regulations require districts to report all 
requested data. The Office for Civil Rights maintains that it requests 
demographic data about all public schools, including alternative schools.345 
Such data is critical in enabling the Department of Education to monitor 
compliance with federal statutes, including statutes that are designed to 
protect students from discrimination. However, OCR’s definition of 
“alternative” is narrow; it includes only “schools that are adjunct to a regular 
school, e.g., are located on the same campus as a regular school but have a 
separate principal or administrator.”346 Yet, as noted previously, most AEPs 
are not on the campus of a regular school. This means that an important tool 
for data collection and compliance monitoring that is available in the regular 
education context is not available for AEPs. 
E. THE NEED FOR AND ABSENCE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN AEP 
TRANSFERS 
The absence of due process protections for students and their parents 
prior to an AEP transfer means that they have no meaningful ability to contest 
a decision. While a school administrator may meet with a family and allow for 
input, formalized procedures are absent and families have no right of appeal 
should they disagree with the decision made. The justification for this practice 
tends to be that an AEP transfer is merely an assignment to a school, and so 
the student should have no more right to contest it than she would if she were 
being sent to a different school subject to, for example, a districting change 
imposed by a school board.  
Yet that justification ignores the fact that AEPs are designed to be 
different and frequently are substandard. Students have challenged the denial 
 
 344. Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 1005, 129 Stat. 1802, 1838 
(to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (d)(1)(A)).  
 345.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/data.html (“Since 1968, the U.S. Department of 
Education (ED) has conducted the Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) to collect data on key 
education and civil rights issues in our nation's public schools. . . . The CRDC collects a variety of 
information including student enrollment and educational programs and services, most of which 
is disaggregated by race/ethnicity, sex, limited English proficiency, and disability [and] is a 
longstanding and important aspect of the ED Office for Civil Rights (OCR) overall strategy for 
administering and enforcing the civil rights statutes for which it is responsible.”). 
 346. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 2011–12 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION 
DEFINITIONS, https://ocrdata.ed.gov.  
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of due process in transfers to AEPs, largely on these grounds.347 They have 
argued that an AEP assignment constitutes a deprivation of a protected 
property interest in education and liberty interest in reputation in the same 
manner as a suspension, and so the due process protections guaranteed by 
Goss should apply.348 Most courts to take up the issue have ruled that students 
are not entitled to due process when being transferred to an AEP, absent a 
showing that the education received at the AEP is significantly inferior to that 
received at the student’s regular public school,349 or, in some circuits, is so 
poor as to be tantamount to expulsion.350  
The Fifth Circuit case of Nevares v. San Marcos Consolidated Independent 
School District typifies the analysis employed in most circuits.351 In this 1997 
decision, the plaintiff faced transfer to an AEP and challenged this transfer in 
court.352 In ruling against the plaintiff, the Court held that a transfer to the 
AEP need not be preceded by procedural due process protections because 
“[h]e was only to be transferred from one school program to another 
program with stricter discipline.”353 Consistent with post-Goss courts’ 
deference to the notion that schools maintain near-total discretion to suspend 
in order to promote school safety, the court characterized the plaintiff as one 
among a class of students “who for reasons of safety and order must be 
removed from the regular classroom.”354 The court overlooked the fact that 
the incident triggering his transfer—allegedly throwing rocks at a car and 
injuring passengers—had occurred off campus, and thus there was no 
 
 347. See Patty Blackburn Tillman, Procedural Due Process for Texas Public School Students Receiving 
Disciplinary Transfers to Alternative Education Programs, 3 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 209, 212 (1996); 
Maureen Carroll, Racialized Assumptions and Constitutional Harm: Claims of Injury Based on Public 
School Assignment, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 903, 906–14 (2011) (discussing cases). 
 348. See Blackburn Tillman, supra note 347, at 212; Carroll, supra note 347, at 906–14 
(discussing cases). 
 349. See Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1359 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding no right to 
notice and an opportunity to be heard when the sanction imposed is attendance at an alternative 
school absent showing that education received at the alternative school is significantly different 
from or inferior to that received at his regular public school). But see Carroll, supra note 347, at 
914 (arguing that these negative due process decisions do not constitute a consensus). 
 350. Marner ex rel. Marner v. Eufaula City Sch. Bd., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (M.D. Ala. 2002).  
 351. Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25, 26–27 (5th Cir. 1997); see 
also Chyma v. Tama Cty. Sch. Bd., No. C07-0056, 2008 WL 4552942, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 8, 
2008) (noting “the consensus of the circuits . . . that placement in an alternative school does not 
implicate procedural due process rights unless there is a showing that the education provided by 
the alternative school is substantially inferior”). 
 352. Nevares, 111 F.3d at 26. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 26, 27 (“We recognize the importance of trust and confidence between students 
and school administrators. For that reason the student and parents must be treated fairly and 
given the opportunity to explain why anticipated assignments may not be warranted. But that is 
for Texas and the local schools to do. We would not aid matters by relegating the dispute to 
federal litigation.”).  
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showing that the student in fact posed any threat to safety and order within 
the classroom.355 
The Nevares court further held, employing reasoning adopted by multiple 
courts subsequently, that assignment to an AEP was a de minimis deprivation,356 
finding that students have no protected interest in attending a particular 
school.357 This conclusion glossed over the significant educational problems 
inherent in the AEP that the lower court had outlined.358  
The Nevares opinion evinces a denial of, or indifference to, the 
problematic features of AEPs. As a Pennsylvania court held some 40 years ago 
in ruling that due process protections should precede an AEP transfer359:  
To transfer a pupil during a school year . . . would be a terrifying 
experience for many children . . . . Any disruption in a primary or 
secondary education, whether by suspension or involuntary transfer, 
is a loss of educational benefits and opportunities. Realistically, I 
think many if not most students would consider a short suspension 
a less drastic form of punishment than an involuntary transfer . . . .360  
Of course, it is possible if not likely that even with procedural due process 
protections, school districts would continue to be able to transfer students 
largely at will; after all, students seeking to contest suspensions typically do 
not succeed. Nonetheless, even the semblance of a formal proceeding could 
function to provide students a sense of agency and meaningful participation 
in their educational decisions. Such a sense of agency and participation could 
ultimately lead the student to invest more effort during her time at an AEP, 
thus improving her potential educational outcomes.361 
 
 355. Id. Furthermore, the court embraced—without carefully analyzing—the putative 
rationale behind zero-tolerance policies: “it is generally recognized that students [other than 
those being assigned to AEPs] are being deprived of their education by lack of discipline in the 
schools.” Id. at 26–27. 
 356. See id. at 27. 
 357. Id.; see, e.g., C.B. v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 389 n.5 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the right 
to a public education does not encompass “a right to choose one’s particular school” (quoting 
Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 576 (10th Cir. 1994))). 
 358. Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 954 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (W.D. Tex. 
1996) (noting the limited amount of lecturing time, dearth of textbooks, and constant 
surveillance by teachers). 
 359. Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397, 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
 360. Id.; see also D.C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 879 A.2d 408, 409, 418–19 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2005) (holding that state law that automatically consigned all youth returning to school from 
detention facilities to a transition center without a hearing violates due process). 
 361.  In the related context of juvenile justice, scholars have argued that procedural justice 
theory recognizes that “when a child feels that the system has treated her fairly, she is more likely 
to accept responsibility for her actions and take steps towards reform.”  Tamar Birckhead, Toward 
a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF L. REV. 1447, 1508 (2009).  Such insights are 
difficult to test, but they find support in the AEP context.  See infra notes 365–66 and 
accompanying text. 
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F. VOLUNTARY REFORMS (AND THEIR INADEQUACIES) 
While effective legal remedies do not appear to exist for meaningfully 
challenging the new exclusion, states and school districts are in some cases 
taking voluntary steps to improve. These efforts were emboldened when the 
Obama Administration issued powerful guidance for school districts urging 
the adoption and implementation of non-exclusionary discipline. In the face 
of significant criticism from advocates, scholars, and policymakers, some 
school districts have backed away from “zero tolerance” suspension policies.362 
In some instances, districts have simply replaced these policies with policies 
that grant administrators significant discretion to suspend students for a wide 
array of minor and subjective infractions.363 In other cases, however, districts 
have implemented policies designed to reward good behavior and create non-
exclusionary means of resolving conflict. So, for example, restorative-justice 
programs exist, as do meditation programs. Of course, as other scholars have 
pointed out, these kinds of voluntary changes will last only as long as there is 
administrative support; the absence of meaningful legal recourse for students 
means that they have no enforceable rights to contest exclusion, should 
schools revert to suspension in the future.364 
Relatedly, one possible solution to the absence of effective legal 
mechanisms to contest AEP transfer and argue that AEPs do not meet 
students’ legally recognized needs would be to rely entirely on voluntary 
efforts to improve the programs. Qualitative evaluations of AEPs have 
revealed that students reporting satisfaction with their programs consistently 
note similar characteristics: small class size, flexibility in administration, good 
teacher training, parental involvement in decision-making, and a process for 
 
 362. In January 2014, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights issued a 
resource guide for improving school climate and discipline, suggesting that schools employ a 
tiered approach to discipline and reminding schools that the Federal Gun-Free Schools Act “does 
not require that states or schools implement wide-ranging zero-tolerance policies or rely on 
exclusionary discipline” for acts that do not involve firearms. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE AND DISCIPLINE 15 (2014); 
Black, supra note 134, at 837–41 (discussing criticism of zero-tolerance policies). 
 363. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3401(b)(1)(C) (2016) (listing behavior “[p]rejudicial to 
good order” as an offense triggering suspension); ACLU OF FLA. ET AL., STILL HAVEN’T SHUT OFF THE 
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF FLORIDA’S NEW ZERO-TOLERANCE LAW 4, 8 
(2011), http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/be89ef01bcb350c7fc_z5m6btbgo.pdf (discussing changes 
to the Florida zero tolerance policies which include giving more discretion to school administrators 
before punishing a student, but also noting that these changes have still failed to adequately protect 
students); Rebecca Morton, Note, Returning “Decision” to School Discipline Decisions: An Analysis of Recent, 
Anti-Zero Tolerance Legislation, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 757, 759 (2014) (discussing new school discipline 
laws enacted in Texas, North Carolina, Colorado, and Massachusetts, which permit or require 
consideration of other factors before disciplining a student, including “a student’s intent, self-defense, 
disability, and disciplinary history”). 
 364. Black, supra note 134, at 864–65 (noting some positive voluntary change in large school 
districts but describing the courts’ decades-long trend away from seriously entertaining students’ 
procedural or substantive due process claims). 
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admission that permits students to exercise some degree of choice before 
attending.365 Some states and school districts may in fact commit to running 
high-quality AEPs and working to ensure that students within them can 
succeed.366  
While reform efforts may improve individual AEPs, however, undertaking 
them is a task that elides two, more fundamental problems. First, designating 
a student “at risk” is a process involving subjectivity and permitting 
administrator discretion. Data indicate that the designation thus far has 
resulted in AEPs that closely track historical patterns of exclusion of students 
of color and students with disabilities.367 The creation and administration of 
separate and demonstrably inferior educational settings thus seems to 
constitute a politically palatable way for schools to continue to engage in long-
standing patterns of exclusion.368  
Second, the underlying logic of AEPs seems to be, in some measure, to 
deter student misbehavior and academic failure;369 if the student would only 
conform to academic and behavioral norms, then no AEP assignment would 
be necessary. Some courts have reasoned that paring down the educational 
experience to the most basic elements helps deter misbehavior.370 Yet such 
logic then creates a problematic and arguably unethical bind for 
administrators and educators, who presumably must create and administer 
schools that are in fact undesirable enough to deter bad behavior.371  
As mentioned, students are more likely to report satisfaction with their 
AEPs when they believe they had some say about whether to attend.372 This 
finding suggests that it is not necessarily the existence of a separate and 
different school that is problematic, but rather the process of being forced to 
 
 365. QUINN & POIRIER, supra note 181, at 16 (explaining that these characteristics are in need 
of further empirical study—it is unclear whether they produce or are simply correlated with 
positive outcomes—but arguing that because they frequently appear in the evaluative literature, 
they warrant further discussion and examination). 
 366. See id. at 7–10. 
 367. See supra notes 220–27 and accompanying text. 
 368. India Geronimo, Deconstructing the Marginalization of “Underclass” Students: Disciplinary 
Alternative Education, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 429, 445 (2011) (“Placing students in [AEPs] is an 
effective method for getting rid of students who are difficult to teach. This structure allows school 
officials to claim that they have not given up on at-risk students without actually committing to 
the task of educating these students effectively.” (footnote omitted)). 
 369. SOLEIL GREGG, SCHOOLS FOR DISRUPTIVE STUDENTS: A QUESTIONABLE ALTERNATIVE? 6 
(1998). 
 370. See, e.g., Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 916 (1996) 
(“We wish to make it crystal clear that pupils who misbehave should not be rewarded for their 
conduct. [They] should and do forfeit . . . all the privileges typically associated with being a 
regular student, such as, interscholastic and intermural athletics; music, drama and speech 
programs; and all other extracurricular activities.”). 
 371. GREGG, supra note 367, at 6 (“[A] punitive purpose may put educators in the awkward—
if not unconscionable—position of creating schools undesirable enough to deter bad behavior.”). 
 372.  See supra notes 367–68 and accompanying text. 
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attend it. Ultimately, deciding the best educational policy for students 
struggling with behavior or deemed at risk of educational failure is beyond 
the scope of this Article. But given the problems that seem endemic to the 
system of AEP transfer, policymakers should consider abandoning this 
educational innovation.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The vision of public schools as a mechanism for promoting social 
cohesion remains to be fulfilled. While group-based exclusion according to 
classifications of race or disability is now prohibited, the practice of exclusion 
persists. Over the last thirty years, schools have suspended, and transferred 
into separate schools, far too many students.  
The existence of research showing that suspending students improves 
neither the behavior of the suspended student nor the overall school climate 
offers some hope that the tide will turn toward the direction of retaining 
rather than pushing out troubled and troubling students. In addition, recent 
scrutiny of AEPs373 may offer hope for change. Yet states and school districts 
will need to commit to a notion that all students truly are deserving of the full 
promise of public education envisioned by common-school proponents.  
 
 373. See, e.g., Vogell & Fresques, supra note 2.  
